Developed Countries Can Hardly Expect the Global South to Dance to Their Tune

June 15, 2023

About the author:

 

In May 2023, the China-Central Asia Summit and the Group of Seven (G7) Summit took place successively in Xi’an, China, and Hiroshima, Japan. The close temporal proximity of these two summits inevitably created a sense of competition, highlighting two distinct diplomatic philosophies. It is worth noting that the G7 Summit, led by Japan, extensively emphasized the “China threat theory” during discussions on geopolitics, economy, and climate issues. Furthermore, it laid considerable stress on strengthening ties with the Global South, attempting to broaden the international coalition while exerting pressure on Russia and curtailing China’s growing influence.

 

1. G7 member states do not have a unified China policy

Japan invited leaders from countries outside the G7 to Hiroshima, including those from India, Brazil, the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Australia, Comoros (Rotating Chair of the African Union), Cook Islands (Rotating Chair of the Pacific Islands Forum), Indonesia (Rotating Chair of ASEAN), and Ukraine. This ultra-long guest list, amidst the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and tense relations between China and the U.S., was interpreted as a blatant attempt to contain Russia and China.

 

The joint communiqué issued in Hiroshima covered various topics, but its notable emphasis was on China. According to Reuters, China was mentioned as many as 20 times in the communiqué, surpassing last year’s G7 Summit in Germany, which had 14 mentions. The communiqué not only reiterated previous concerns regarding the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and China’s nuclear development transparency, but also introduced new terms such as “economic coercion” and “de-risking” in relation to China. Furthermore, it called upon China to exert pressure on Russia for an “immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of its military forces from Ukraine.”

 

The communiqué clearly demonstrates a broad consensus among G7 member states regarding China-related topics. The G7 leaders are attempting to showcase a unified stance in their dealings with China and have established a shared framework of discourse. Nevertheless, while those leaders appeared to have acknowledged China’s “systemic challenge” to their values and interests, their respective policies towards China still reveal discrepancies and do not exhibit the same level of unity observed in their approach to Russia.

 

Take the “Big Three” European countries—France, Germany, and the UK—as examples. France and Germany are adopting a more rational and pragmatic approach towards China, which encompasses both concerns and a willingness to engage in cooperation. Following his visit to China in April 2023, , French President Emmanuel Macron stated that Europe should not become “America’s followers.” He advocated for reducing dependence on the U.S. to “avoid getting dragged into a confrontation between China and the U.S. over Taiwan” and avoid “getting caught up in crises that are not ours.” The French president urged Europe to assert its strategic autonomy and position itself as a third force separate from both China and the U.S.

 

Macron’s stance undeniably represents a continuation of “Gaullism” and has found some resonance across Europe. Charles Michel, President of the European Council, clearly acknowledged that President Macron’s views are not isolated among EU member state leaders. “Some European leaders wouldn’t say things the same way that Emmanuel Macron did... I think quite a few really think like Emmanuel Macron,” he said.

 

Germany’s policy towards China is apparently more complex due to the influence of the three-party coalition government with diverse ideologies. The Greens and the Free Democratic Party take a tough stance towards China, and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has openly criticized China on several occasions. Bilateral relations are strained from time to time by the attempts to decrease dependency, human rights concerns, and the Taiwan question. Moreover, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has been enhancing risk management for German businesses operating in China, trying to reduce German investments in China while limiting Chinese investments in Germany.

 

Chancellor Olaf Scholz has adopted a relatively moderate position. Recognizing China as “a partner, competitor and systematic rival,” the German government pursues a pragmatic foreign policy that prioritizes national interests and compromises in resolving conflicts. It advocates for decreasing dependency on China while maintaining commercial relations and seeking cooperation in areas that align with mutual interests. Scholz has emphasized that China’s rise “does not warrant isolating Beijing or curbing cooperation,” and that pursuing diversified foreign trade should not be mistaken for “decoupling from China.”

 

UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, known for his critical approach towards China, once said that China “poses the greatest challenge to global security and prosperity.” However, he has also recognized China’s undeniable importance in global affairs. In a recent development, he has reversed his campaign commitment and declared that he would not shut down 30 Confucius Institutes, signaling a potential shift in the UK government’s stance towards re-engaging with China.

 

The U.S. has been urging its allies to adopt a more assertive strategy to deter China, yet the G7 Summit in Hiroshima also highlighted the significance of engaging in dialogue with China. The G7 member states “stand prepared to build constructive and stable relations with China,” with the aim of “de-risking” rather than “decoupling.” Such a statement reflected the Biden administration’s acknowledgment of the viewpoints held by certain G7 members and the need to make concessions in order to develop a cohesive policy towards China.

 

2. The Global South is reluctant to stand in line against China

The G7 Summit in Hiroshima prioritized “upholding a rules-based international order” and “forging stronger connections with the Global South.” This entailed a specific focus on exploring tangible measures to expand cooperation with Global South countries. In recent times, the rising population and economic influence of the Global South have played a progressively substantial role in shaping a new multipolar world. Given China’s extending global reach, the G7 aims to divide the Global South and garner support from some of its members, utilizing group politics and economic alliances as a means to safeguard their own global influence against what they believed to be the potential threats from China and Russia.

 

Nonetheless, the G7 would face notable challenges in trying to attain this objective. The vast majority of Global South countries believe that getting embroiled in disputes between “democratic” and “authoritarian” nations is not worth the cost, and they are unwilling to take sides. Furthermore, the Chinese government has been augmenting its investments to narrow the gap between the Global North and the Global South. Meanwhile, some Global South nations are concerned that their local economies might suffer if the Sino-U.S. relations were to spiral out of control. But as up to now, China’s trade with the Global South has continued to thrive, despite various attempts by the U.S. to hinder such developments.

 

Take Africa as an example. Over the past decade, the total trade volume between China and Africa has surpassed USD 2 trillion, which establishes China as the continent’s primary trading partner. In the meantime, China’s direct investments in Africa have exceeded USD 30 billion, which positions China as the fourth largest source of investment for the continent. In the first four months of this year alone, China’s new direct investments in Africa reached USD 1.38 billion, up 24% year-on-year. The Chinese government holds the African people in high regard and perceives African countries as equal partners. It is now stepping up efforts to implement the “Nine Programs” in medical, poverty reduction and agricultural development, trade promotion, investment promotion, digital innovation, green development, capacity building, cultural exchange, and peace and security areas, aiming to foster a high-level Sino-African community with a shared future. So far, China has earned high praise from African countries for successfully completing a number of infrastructure and livelihood projects.

 

However, it is imperative to acknowledge that tackling the challenges encountered by the Global South is more complex than merely recognizing them. Regrettably, despite frequent visits by G7 leaders to the Global South and their endeavors to enhance development conditions and compete for influence with China, their aid programs often lack flexibility and fail to align with the realities on the ground. They have been subject to criticism for their condescending and paternalistic approach. Many Global South countries find themselves in a dilemma due to the stringent conditions attached to aid from G7 member states. Consequently, they are increasingly inclined to opt for a global development partnership with China that is founded on the basis of solidarity, equality, well-balanced approach, and mutual benefit.

 

3. The reviving influence of the G7

When the G7 was established in the 1970s, its member states represented over 60% of the global GDP, leading to its characterization as the “rich man’s club.” However, with the rise of developing countries such as China and India, the G7’s share in the global GDP has gradually declined. According to IMF data, it has decreased from 50.7% in 1980 to a projected 29.9% for 2023. What is more, internal divisions concerning trade and climate policies within the G7 have become more prominent. Many have noted that the G7 often fails to follow through with actions and excludes emerging powers like China and India in dealing with some key world issues. Consequently, there is a growing sentiment that the G7, in its current form, lacks a valid justification for its existence and should be replaced by a more representative group of nations.

 

The establishment of the G20 marked a shift from “Western governance” to “global co-governance.” Many believe that the G20 has surpassed the G7 in terms of power and prestige. However, not everyone disregards the significance of the G7. Supporters argue that the small size and the relative like-mindedness of G7 member states is conducive to collective decision-making. In fact, in recent years, the “rich man’s club” has experienced a resurgence in strength and solidarity. This trend is particularly evident through the agreement achieved by member states in 2021 regarding global tax reform. Additionally, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has, to some extent, bridged the divide among the West, as their shared objective of imposing sanctions on Russia has fostered greater unity among member states.

 

Furthermore, in response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the G7 has launched the “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment,” the “Five-Point Plan for Critical Mineral Security,” and the “Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion.” These initiatives aim to enhance supply chain security through strategies like “friend-shoring” and “near-shoring.” Participating countries are expected to provide early warnings and share information concerning instances of economic coercion, so as to prevent the weaponization of trade and supply chains. Perceived threats from both China and Russia are no doubt conducive to the G7’s cohesion and influence.

 

Notably, the G7 still holds over two-fifths of the voting power in both the World Bank and the IMF. Additionally, the group is playing a greater role in financing international humanitarian efforts. Together with the European Commission, the G7 contributes up to 70% of the budget for the World Food Programme. In the coming years, the G7 will further strengthen its cooperation with international organizations such as the African Union, with a focus on helping the Global South nations tackle their development challenges. Such cooperation will particularly extend to nations that possess rich resources and hold strategic importance, even if they are not core allies. In particular, against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the G7 recognizes the opportunity to address issues that have proven challenging for the UN and the G20.

 

The Global South will be a central theme of the G7 Summit in Italy next year. By then, the G7’s stature is likely to experience further elevation, although this outcome is not guaranteed. After all, the future of the G7 is tied to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and the evolving dynamics in its relations with China. Today, countries in the Global South are aspiring to strike a pragmatic balance between the concerns of both Washington and Beijing. They hold their own perspectives, even on such sensitive matters as the Russia-Ukraine conflict. If the G7 misinterprets the needs of the Global South, ignores the Global South’s concerns on inflation, commodity price shock and debt dilemma, and positions itself as an anti-China or anti-Russia alliance, more Global South countries may hesitate to take the olive branch the G7 holds out. Such an outcome would not serve the interests of any party, including those of the G7.

 

It is worth noting that the long-standing Achilles’ heel of the G7 has been its grand narratives and lack of follow-up actions. As Max Lawson, Head of Inequality Policy at Oxfam International, put it, “G7 countries have failed the Global South here in Hiroshima. They failed to cancel debts, and they failed to find what is really required to end the huge increase in hunger worldwide. They can find untold billions for fighting the war but can’t even provide half of what is needed by the UN for the most critical humanitarian crises.”

 

Considering such a reputation, if the G7 intends to enhance its influence, it must appropriately exempt middle- and low-income countries from debt burdens, diligently fulfill aid targets, resolve outstanding payments, and uphold climate commitments towards impoverished nations. The question here and now is whether the G7 leaders will demonstrate necessary political will to accomplish all these objectives.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Please note: The above contents only represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.

 

This article is from the June issue of TI Observer (TIO), which is a monthly publication devoted to bringing China and the rest of the world closer together by facilitating mutual understanding and promoting exchanges of views. If you are interested in knowing more about the October issue, please click here:

http://www.taiheinstitute.org/Content/2023/06-30/2334020338.html

 

 

——————————————

ON TIMES WE FOCUS.

Should you have any questions, please contact us at public@taiheglobal.org