China-US Relations Post-Woodside – Rhetoric and Reality

January 12, 2024

About the author:

Brian Wong Yueshun, Assistant Professor in Philosophy, and Fellow at the Centre on Contemporary China and the World, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China.

Introduction:

Despite positive strides made during the China-US summit in November 2023, structural forces underpinning China-US relations persist. Frictions may still arise in the short- to medium-term as existing skepticism and domestic challenges steer this dynamic relationship. However, in long-term, frank and pragmatic relations may be established through people-to-people diplomacy.

The Chinese President and his US counterpart Joe Biden met in Woodside, to the south of San Francisco on November 15, on the sidelines of APEC 2023.

This historic summit demarcated the first in-person exchange held between the two leaders since their meeting in Bali in November 2022, and the subsequent weather balloon incident that occurred earlier this year. At this critical juncture in the bilateral relationship, the two leaders' four-hour discussion surveyed a wide range of areas over which the two preeminent powers of the world agree, disagree, compete, and cooperate. Both positives and negatives were thoroughly examined in, as Biden stated, "some of the most constructive and productive discussions we've had."

Much ink has been spilled on the significance of this meeting to the China-US bilateral relationship. Yet to grasp the full context, we must first unpack the structural forces that have remained largely intact in Sino-American relations before considering present and future incidental forces influencing the short- to medium-term. Only then may we finally return to the question at hand: how should those advocating better relations between the two powers continue to take up the mantle as we head into 2024?

The structural fundamentals remain the same.

Mere weeks after the Woodside meeting, the Biden administration introduced a slew of technological export bans, blockades, and targeted sanctions – coupled with declarative statements issued by US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo that "We cannot let China get these chips. Period."¹ The two leaders did not expressly rule out technological competition in their talks; yet one could be forgiven for thinking that the rapprochement in China-US relations, to the extent it is sincere, would give US politicians and lawmakers pause over advancing measures aimed at curbing China's technological developments.

We must not neglect a fundamental fact that has not changed since the Woodside meeting. Given China's status as a theoretical contender to American supremacy and hegemony across geo-strategic, military, technological, and economic fronts, there exists an innate urge within the American political establishment to "keep China down." It is evident – and ideal – that in recent years, Beijing has adopted a pragmatic and results-oriented approach to handling the doctrinaire sense of American entitlement and resisted pressures to lash out irresponsibly. It is also clear that Biden and his closest aides and advisors on foreign policy have sought to define and abide by certain boundaries. These boundaries are aimed at managing the level to which the existential angst in the American establishment would inflame tensions over sensitive issues. After all, the US can ill afford to be embroiled in further military conflicts today.

Yet the undergirding logic of great power rivalry has not been altered by the two leaders' meeting – a vast majority of the lobbyists, think-tank strategists, and politicians in Washington have yet to accept an ascendant Beijing. Beijing, on the other hand, remains deeply alarmed by the avowed intentions of many in the US Congress, especially Republicans, who portray China as a threat to American interests and have sought to justify "containment" measures directed against China in the name of US interests. Mutual skepticism persists between the political establishments on both sides of the Pacific.

Such perceptions arise from discomfort with China's economic rise. Few countries in the world's history have accomplished what China has managed to do with its economy through the dexterity, ingenuity, and collective solidarity it displayed throughout the past forty years of reform and opening-up efforts. In 1980, China's nominal GDP was 6.7% of the US (191 billion USD to 2.86 trillion USD).² As of 2020, the ratio was close to 70% (14.69 trillion USD to 21.06 trillion USD). For comparison, US scholars and commentators began sounding the alarm over the ostensible threat posed by Japan's prowess as a manufacturing giant and rival to the US in the early 1980s; in 1980, Japan's nominal GDP was no more than 39% of the US GDP.

For a power that has grown so accustomed to de facto unipolarity since the late 1980s, America's elite came to feel fundamentally anxious about the preeminence of a country that appears to be so different, institutionally, and culturally, from itself. Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden did not see eye-to-eye over many issues, yet both men agreed on the ostensible need for America to constrain and limit China's technological and economic ascent – the former pursued a reckless, unilateralist "trade war"; the latter sought to strengthen existing multilateral frameworks and weaponize legally ambiguous sanctions to target Chinese exports. Consequently, Beijing's suspicions towards the US are by no means unwarranted.

We should also remember that the US today remains deeply divided and unequal. The beneficiaries from globalization – which was hypothesized to eventually lift all boats – never saw the imperative to redress the suffering and plight of the "losers." The Rust Belt is a case in point: workers displaced by an amalgamation of automation and globalization have found themselves unable to transition to new, gainful employment. Since the late 1970s, inflation-adjusted pay for most US workers has remained largely stagnant, whilst the country's highest earners have experienced an astronomical increase in wages.³ The American middle class is hollowed out by a US consumption glut, dearth of industrial diversification, and fundamental inability to out-compete more promising, capable rival manufacturing powers in the Global South. The sense of loss, the innate status anxiety, and the resultant mistrust of the political establishment thus gave rise to the emergence of populist candidates such as Trump – whose return to White House in 2024 is looking increasingly likely. Whilst Biden's "Inflation Reduction Act" has gone some way in creating new employment opportunities, America remains rife with socioeconomic inequalities and cultural-identitarian divides.⁴ In face of such divisions, it is tempting – and politically convenient – for politicians to paint China as the bogeyman, which creates an echo chamber and self-reinforcing cycle of demonization.

Yet there were many reasons for the Woodside meeting to take place.

Whilst the structural forces have not changed, they can be temporarily restrained and outweighed by more salient considerations – this is a fact missed by most simplistic structural deterministic accounts. President Biden is entering into an election year where his closest – and greatest – rival is currently leading him in polls across key states, despite being indicted and embroiled in ignominy over his role in instigating the January 6 riots in 2021. He is fighting hard to preserve his legacy in relation to Ukraine, which NATO has viewed and maintained to be a key linchpin in the NATO-Russia struggle. Yet he is also trying to push for increased American aid to Israel, a long-standing geopolitical partner in the Middle East region, where Washington is increasingly isolated. As it stands, Biden does not possess the legislative bandwidth or political capital to prosecute a war – directly or via proxies – with China. Any further kinetic wars would prove disastrous for US grand strategy.

Furthermore, despite the tentative successes his administration has had in reining in inflation, concerns remain that the renewable transition and the possibility of regionalization of the conflict in Gaza could yield serious supply-side inflationary pressures that require the Federal Reserve to delay the slashing of rates. This could exert significant downward pressure on the economy, especially as American importers and consumers are forced to bear the brunt of the costly supply chain "re-shoring" and "friend-shoring" measures touted as necessary in mitigating against geopolitical risks. Biden needs to avoid conflicts with Beijing to raise his chances of re-election. As such, whilst the Democratic ticket will indubitably deploy harsh, bellicose rhetoric concerning China going into 2024 to mollify domestic voters, Biden is unlikely to rock the boat when it comes to rolling out substantive policy departures on "red-line" issues. More outbound investment and export bans, as well as sanctions, should nevertheless be expected, as both parties in Congress maintain their intransigent antagonism towards China.

Symmetrically, the Chinese leadership remains committed to the notion of peaceful coexistence, as a proposal that reconciles the interests of the American people, the Democratic (and more moderate Republican) establishment, with the continued rise of China as an economic powerhouse. Beijing is keen to signal to the world that China remains a safe, open, and fundamentally stable power that does not, and will not engage in the adventurist revisionism that some have accused it of intending. Territorial and national sovereignty issues are non-negotiable, yet this does not imply that China is cavalier concerning the deployment of military force. The Woodside meeting, and the Chinese President's subsequent speech at the CEO banquet, went a long way in assuaging the exaggerated fears of many in the US business community concerning China's openness to foreign capital, willingness to collaborate with the West over core issues of international importance, and attitudes towards the US.

The future of China-US relations rests with their people.

Whether it be the new panda "envoys" that the Chinese President may send to the US, or the "50,000 American students" that the leader expressed potential interest in attracting to China, it is apparent that concrete steps were undertaken in Woodside to enhance the level of people-to-people exchanges between China and the US. This is a necessary, crucial, and most reassuring step: the future of China-US relations rests with the ability of their people to develop deep, meaningful, and transformative ties, like ties between the Chinese President and the Iowa community that hosted him in 1985.

People-to-people diplomacy must be permitted to thrive on its own, and of its own accord. Unlike politicians, individual citizens can be free of political encumberments and partisanship, which often hinders sincere and frank exchanges. They also bring their own unique perspectives, as academics, journalists, scientists, or cultural practitioners and industry professionals. Compared with the interest-based transactions between diplomats, or the riven posturing and bluffing between governments and politicians, the default engagement mode between citizens remains more benign, more open-minded, and dynamic.

Recent efforts aimed at cooling the heat in the bilateral relationship seem to have made tentative progress. A Morning Consult poll revealed that whilst in April 2022, over 80% of Chinese respondents saw the US as an enemy, that number had fallen to less than 50% in October 2023.⁵ To maintain the easing momentum in China-US relations, both governments must step up efforts in facilitating people-to-people dialogue. More conferences, discussions, keynote lectures, and addresses concerning topics of mutual interests should take place. No topic should be deemed off-limits behind closed doors, and track-two meetings should take place over a wide range of areas, from climate change, to AI cooperation, and anthropological and sociological study of China through non-Westernized lenses. We must encourage individuals who see value and potential in China-US relations to contribute to deepening mutual understanding, trust, and sharing of insights and information. Only then may we make headway in preventing systemic misunderstandings and misconceptions between the two peoples.

A key cornerstone is the youth of both countries. Whilst a Pew Research survey suggested that over half of US adults aged 50 and above hold unfavorable views of China, those percentages are much lower for individuals aged 18-29 (29%) and 30-49 (37%). 23% of those aged under 30 hold net favorable views towards China, as compared with 8% for 65+.⁶ Time could be on the side of China-US friendship, so long as China continues to open itself up for foreign visitors and travel, attract entrepreneurs and investors from the West, and double down on making international education and cultural exchanges more accessible and attractive for youth across the Pacific.

Symmetrically, American universities and educators must guard against the growing tides of neo-McCarthyism across college campuses, and put an end to initiatives that have intimidated Chinese scholars and students alike, eschewing benign and mutually constructive collaboration. The best means for youth of any country to see the virtues and merits of other countries is for them to travel abroad, learn from their fellow peers, and to develop a deeper and more multi-dimensional understanding of the world at large. The US must not forget and jettison a virtue that made it a great power in the first place – the embrace of intellectual pluralism.

The world is large enough to accommodate two great powers. Hope for realizing that vision lies with the peoples – especially the youth – of China and the US.

1. Ari Hawkins, "Raimondo chides Congress on China tech threat," Politico, April 12, 2023. https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-trade/2023/12/04/raimondo-chides-congress-on-china-tech-threat-00129841.

2. "GDP (Current US$) - United States," World Bank, accessed December 20, 2023, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US.

3. David Cooper and Lawrence Mishel, "America’s Vast Pay Inequality is a Story of Unequal Power," ABA, January 6, 2023, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/wealth-disparities-in-civil-rights/americas-vast-pay-inequality-is-a-story-of-unequal-power/.

4. "The Inflation Reduction Act," House Budget Committee Democrats, last modified August 15, 2023, https://democrats-budget.house.gov/legislation/InflationReductionAct.

5. Scott Moskowitz, "The State of U.S.-China Relations: H2 2023 Report," Morning Consult, November, 2023, https://pro.morningconsult.com/analyst-reports/china-us-relations-2023-report.

6. Laura Silver et al., "Americans Are Critical of China’s Global Role and Relationship with Russia," Pew Research Center, April 12, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/04/12/americans-are-critical-of-chinas-global-role-as-well-as-its-relationship-with-russia/.

Please note: The above contents only represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.

This article is from the December issue of TI Observer (TIO), which examines the prospective development of China-US relations and the implications for the global landscape. If you are interested in knowing more about the December issue, please click here:

http://www.taiheinstitute.org/Content/2023/12-29/1925510553.html

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