About the author:
Zhang Haozhe, MA in International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, US; Recipient of the Starr Excellence in China Studies Fellowship; TI Youth Observer
Introduction:
The shift from unipolarity towards multipolarity influenced the mentality and actions of China and the US. Both nations are aware that they must coexist within one international framework, engage with each other in an occasionally uncomfortable manner, and collaborate on issues that cannot be unilaterally resolved.
As unipolarity melts, countries are compelled to face with sober senses, their real position in the international system. The most sensational relationship by far must be between China and the US. In the foreseeable future, China and the US will join hands to shape the world we live in. From their interaction, a brand-new world order will emerge.
Ruling and Rising Power Syndromes
When assessing China-US relations, we often analyze them within the framework of power transition theory or Thucydides's Trap. In his seminal work, Destined for War, Graham Allison identifies the inherent tension between newly emerging powers and existent powers as a potential source of structural stress.1
Ruling power syndrome is characterized by an established power's heightened sense of insecurity and fear in response to the ascent of emerging powers. On the other hand, rising power syndrome underscores the desire of the ascendant power to gain recognition and respect in terms of international status.
The interactions between China and the US can be partially observed through this lens. The pivotal shift in US grand strategy occurred abruptly during the second decade of the 21st century. Upon recognizing the rapid ascent of China, Washington swiftly redirected its foreign policy agenda, attempting to reallocate resources back to the Asia-Pacific region. James Steinberg, who served as the Deputy Secretary of State to Hillary Clinton, argued that this strategic pivot in the second term of the Obama administration was "premature," as articulated in his book.2 The political environment inside the Beltway constrained the options for those advocating a more dovish approach, and the engagement policy was convicted as a significant mistake in China-US relations. James Steinberg and his concept of strategic reassurance were set aside, even when the Democrats returned to office. Rhetoric preceded and dominated actions. Panic ensued, ultimately giving rise to the phenomenon of Trump.
China also encountered challenges, whether driven by the top-down evolution of its grand strategy, shaped by the bottom-up demands of economic growth, or simply shocked by the sudden hawkish shift in US foreign policy – or perhaps a combination of these factors. China found itself dealing with an existent power that became increasingly threatening and unfriendly. The accrual of influence naturally created increased visibility of China's rising heft, amplifying US criticisms. Ultimately, xenophobia has become a self-fulfilling prophecy.3
The Recovery and New Evaluation of Reality
In 2023, we are witnessing a recovery for both China and the US from years of comprehensive and tit-for-tat strategic competition. As Ryan Hass stated, Beijing is neither on the cusp of peaking nor on the road to unipolar hegemony.4 Even so, Michael Beckley from Tufts University warned that great power conflicts could arise if a rising power was given no alternative.5
While we can't rule out this possibility, China's current state suggests stability. Indeed, China acknowledges its competitors and admits to facing some challenges. However, China maintains sufficient confidence in its growth potential, institutional advantages, and developmental experience. This confidence solidifies further after observing the Western world dispersing its limited resources due to various conflicts. It is interesting to note that while both China and the US have recovered from ruling and rising power syndromes, they have both started believing that "time is on my side." This mindset might be a misperception, but sometimes, misperceptions bring peace to the system.
Sustainable Competition as a New Status Quo
With the return of rationality, it is evident that both sides have reached some consensus at a structural level in the past year. The more frequent high-level bilateral leadership meetings and the recent summit between the Chinese and US leaders in Woodside are clear manifestations of this. Three lines of consensus are worthy of mention below as these agreements shed light on the new phase of more stable China-US relations.
Firstly, any escalation is undesirable for all. On the Chinese side, China avoids publicly characterizing the bilateral relationship as "strategic competition." The US may also have begun warming to this sentiment. During the 76th UN General Assembly, President Biden assured world leaders that although the US is "confronting China" in terms of military and economic matters, it does not seek to escalate the situation.
Secondly, decoupling is plainly impossible. Beijing consistently criticizes the term "decoupling" and the Biden administration has shifted its narrative from "decoupling" to "de-risking." Although there are no distinct differences between these two terms, the change in rhetoric signifies a potential update in Washington's mindset. During her visit to China, US Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen argued that the US is not seeking to decouple from China. At a press conference, Yellen emphasized that considering the bilateral interdependence and global implications, the decoupling of the two largest economies in the world is "virtually impossible to undertake."6
Thirdly, based on the assessment of the current scenario in context of a years-long trade war, both sides have realized that the relationship between China and the US will be an organic long-term conversation, given the scale and scope of strength on both sides. Both Chinese and US capabilities simultaneously exhibit great resilience. This implies that neither side can resort to all means for a comprehensive offensive. Even if one side gains overwhelming advantages in specific areas, the other can restore the balance quickly, as demonstrated in the battle over semiconductors.
In a nutshell, both sides are aware of, and have accepted reality: they will coexist for a considerable period in the future. This "coexistence" doesn't merely depict the physical presence of both on Earth. It implies that both China and the US will coexist within one functioning international regime, engage with each other in an occasionally uncomfortable manner, and collaborate on a series of agendas that cannot be unilaterally resolved. Simultaneously, they will intermittently compete while being cautious about crossing certain lines.
Tao Guang Yang Hui (Keep a Low Profile) 2.0
If the US wishes to cultivate competition, China must respond. The question for Beijing is, what kind of principles should it pursue in shaping its strategies?
China frames its current relations with the US clearly: there is no middle ground in collaboration, and antagonism is not a viable framework for resilient bilateral relations.7 The United States is more willing to selectively apply hawkish tactics, but also shares some of China's hesitancy to escalate. The overall situation incentivizes the US towards less hawkish paradigms.
Secondly, China must utilize an updated "Keep a Low Profile" principle. Indeed, China is a gigantic force that exerts significant influence in the system, however, China should project these capabilities with selective pragmatism to strategically reserve power in agenda-setting. Additionally, China must reassure other actors in the system, such as the EU and ASEAN countries, to deter the US from engaging in offshore balancing and other competitive practices.
As Jessica Weiss recently argued, deterrence is effective only if accompanied by implicit assurance.8 To exert pressure on the opposite side and enhance the credibility of deterrence, we need spaces for policy implementation back and forth. Reassurance can provide us with these spaces, increasing the potential flexibility of strategies.
Final Discussion
Many instances have demonstrated that a series of rational and ex-ante decisions can lead to unintentional chaos. What we can learn from history is that instead of scrutinizing current policies in search of menial gains, we should also aspire to long-term constructive development. Assessing and discussing current policies is undoubtedly necessary, but we must maintain a broader picture and have a vision, especially when contemplating the China-US relationship and its global implications. We aspire to a world that is peaceful, stable, and prosperous in the next 30 years. We must take this vision as a starting point whenever we think about the current China-US relationship.
1. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (London: Scribe Publications, 2017).
2. James Steinberg and Michael E O'Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).
3. William Callahan, "How to Understand China: The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power," Review of International Studies 31, no. 4 (October 2005): 701–14, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210505006716, 712.
4. Ryan Hass, "What America Wants from China," Foreign Affairs, October 24, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/what-america-wants-china-hass.
5. Michael Beckley, The Peril of Peaking Powers: Economic Slowdowns and Implications for China's Next Decade. International Security 2023; 48 (1): 7–46.
6. "Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen at Press Conference in Beijing, the People's Republic of China," U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 28, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1603.
7. Carla Freeman et al., "Biden and Xi at APEC: Averting Further Crisis in U.S.-China Relations," United States Institute of Peace, November 16, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/11/biden-and-xi-apec-averting-further-crisis-us-china-relations
8. Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen, "Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence," Foreign Affairs, November 30, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-china-true-sources-deterrence.
Please note: The above contents only represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.
This article is from the December issue of TI Observer (TIO), which examines the prospective development of China-US relations and the implications for the global landscape. If you are interested in knowing more about the December issue, please click here:
http://www.taiheinstitute.org/Content/2023/12-29/1925510553.html
——————————————
ON TIMES WE FOCUS.
Should you have any questions, please contact us at public@taiheglobal.org
© 2013-2021 Taihe Institute (TI) . All rights reserved. Taihe Institute (TI) .京ICP备16023694号-1
Privacy Policy丨Terms of Service
Contact Us: public@taiheglobal.org
