Would AUKUS Help Sustain Peace and Stability in Asia-Pacific?

June 20, 2024

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In the joint statement that launched AUKUS in September 2021, the leaders of Australia, the US, and the UK vowed to "deepen diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, including by working with partners, to meet the challenges of the 21^st century." They alleged that the creation of AUKUS would "help sustain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region." ¹

The Asia-Pacific has enjoyed a relatively peaceful environment for more than three decades. Unlike the frequent occurrence of wars and armed conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, there has been no large-scale armed conflict among countries in the Asia-Pacific since the 1990s. Against this background of relative peace and stability, regional countries were able to focus their national strategies on economic development, giving strong momentum to economic growth and continued improvement in the livelihoods of regional people. Aside from outstanding economic and social progress, positive developments have also been witnessed in mutual trust and confidence-building among regional countries through inclusive multilateral security cooperation process as seen in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and others.

However, the United States, as the only superpower in the world, seems increasingly discontent with such a situation, which it deems more favorable for China's influence, and thus has been firm in diverting the regional focus from fostering economic development and inclusive security cooperation to the so-called "security challenge" posed by China. The US is obviously driven by deepening strategic anxieties over China. In pace with its rapid growth in comprehensive national power, China's influence in international economic, political, and security affairs, especially in the Asia-Pacific, has been expanding. The Lowy Institute's Asia Power Snapshot 2022 reported that the United States has lost influence over China in Southeast Asia in terms of economic relationships, defense networks, diplomatic influence, and cultural influence.² Also, the State of Southeast Asia: 2023 Survey Report by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute identified China as the most influential economic and political strategic power in Southeast Asia.³ 

It is not surprising, then, when the Biden administration, in its National Security Strategy issued in October 2022, asserted that China is "the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it," and has ambitions to "create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world's leading power."⁴ Hence, "outcompeting China" becomes the top priority on the US national security agenda. To that end, the Biden administration came up with a threefold strategy toward China, namely "1) to invest in the foundations of our strength at home – our competitiveness, our innovation, our resilience, our democracy, 2) to align our efforts with our network of allies and partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause, and 3) compete responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build our vision for the future."⁵

The Biden administration has attached special attention to consolidating the network of its alliances and security alignments in the region. There are already many US-led military alliances or minilateral security alignments, such as the US alliances with Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Philippines, as well as security platforms like the Quad. The Biden administration appears to believe that the US could not rely solely on existing arrangements to address perceived challenges from China and needs a platform as an axis or hub in its network of alliances and security alignments. This perhaps is one of the most important considerations behind the creation of AUKUS. Although China was not explicitly mentioned in the official announcement, the motivation behind AUKUS is fueled by the perception that China represents a growing regional threat.⁶ For the US, "AUKUS is the latest manifestation of the Biden administration's broad multilateral approach, and its ambition to retain American primacy in the region."⁷

The latest developments in the regional situation over the past two years have proved that AUKUS is bringing uncertainties and even tensions to the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, some international analysts observe that AUKUS has become part of the complicating security problems in the region rather than a solution. As put by Natalie Sambhi, founder and executive director of Verve Research, "The overall impression was that AUKUS would destabilize the region, which was already experiencing heightened strategic tension courtesy of the United States and China."⁸

Driving Major Countries Toward Confrontation

AUKUS is a grouping aimed at dealing with hypothetical threats from China and Russia. The China-US relationship has undergone ups and downs over the past decade. Despite sharp differences, the two countries share common interests. Some positive signs have been seen after the two summit meetings held during the past two years. Yet, the US-driven AUKUS casts a shadow over these slowly recovering relations. China has reiterated its concerns over the "typical Cold War mentality" behind AUKUS, stressing that "the real purpose of AUKUS is to incite bloc division and military confrontation through military cooperation based on exclusive circles." ⁹

Many regional countries worry that AUKUS will increase the securitization of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region and encourage its coalescence into two competing blocs.¹⁰ Should such a scenario appear, countries in the region would be in a difficult position of choice. When asked about competition between China and the US in an interview with Al Jazeera, Indonesia's president-elect Prabowo Subianto said, "The fact that we are friends with you doesn't mean we can't be friends with China, India, Russia."¹¹ As a medium power, Indonesia can insist on its traditional policy of non-alignment under strong pressure, but it may be extremely difficult for smaller countries to follow.

 

Eroding ASEAN Centrality in Regional Affairs

ASEAN's role in driving multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific has been accepted by the vast majority of regional countries. However, the emergence of the Quad and AUKUS, whether intentionally or not, has posed a serious challenge to ASEAN centrality. The dynamism and significance of non-ASEAN bodies, particularly those in which Australia has invested significant time and political capital, are causing concerns within ASEAN. This situation puts ASEAN's goal of remaining at the center of regionalism in Asia at risk.¹² The Quad and AUKUS are centered around the US due to its paramount military power. "This will present Southeast Asian leaders with a difficult strategic choice: either adapt to the era of coalitions and put ASEAN unity at risk, or sit by as new alignments undermine ASEAN centrality."¹³

Undermining Multilateral Security Cooperation Process in the Region

The process of multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, represented by the ASEAN Regional Forum, though at a relatively slow pace and viewed by some Western observers as a "talk-shop," has been exploring a path toward sustainable peace and stability in the region. Significant progress has been made, especially in building an inclusive multilateral security cooperation platform that encompasses almost all countries in the Asia-Pacific. Throughout this process, ASEAN has been at the center and won respect from majority of the regional actors through the ASEAN Way, which is characterized by four principles, namely non-interference, quiet diplomacy, non-use of force, and decision making through consensus. These principles have helped regional countries overcome sharp differences and engage in security cooperation.

An eroded role of ASEAN will inevitably affect the multilateral security process. Commenting on the Quad and AUKUS, Professor Nick Bisley at La Trobe University, Australia, stated, "There is a good chance that the moves in the region that Australia has been at the heart of will mark the end of post-Cold War security multilateralism in Asia. The casting aside of the more inclusive forms of security cooperation, and the focus on exclusive mechanisms that are intended to shape great power competition and not to prevent it, reflect the grim reality of a region in which war is once again in the realm of the thinkable."¹⁴

Endangering the Extremely Fragile International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

James M. Acton, Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, opined that "the nonproliferation implications of the AUKUS submarine deal are both negative and serious."¹⁵ The international nuclear non-proliferation regime has been under serious tests in the past three decades, especially after the nuclear tests and weaponization conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), India, and Pakistan since the late 1990s. Whether other non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWSs) would follow suit haunts international society. Some politicians and scholars in countries like Japan and the ROK have openly voiced an ardent desire for nuclear armament.

Under the framework of AUKUS, the US and the UK would support Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. This move violates the commitments the three countries made as signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and might open a Pandora's Box, stimulating a new cycle of nuclear proliferation. "A more serious concern is the risk of non-nuclear-weapon states using the cover of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines as a covert route to nuclear weapons."¹⁶ Some countries with both the capability and intention may be unable to resist the temptation of starting nuclear weapon programs under the pretense of developing nuclear-powered submarines or airplanes. "While Australia is currently one of the rare NNWSs to seek nuclear-powered submarines – Brazil being another – it is not unthinkable that others, such as ROK or Japan, might more seriously pursue such capabilities further into the future." ¹⁷

The possibility of nuclear proliferation brought about by the AUKUS deal has given rise to global anxiety. Many countries have vented their fears publicly that Australia's decision on the submarines could exacerbate nuclear proliferation. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry stated on September 17, 2021, that "Indonesia takes note cautiously of the Australian Government's decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines; Indonesia is deeply concerned over the continuing arms race and power projection in the region; Indonesia stresses the importance of Australia's commitment to continue meeting all of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations."¹⁸ Replying to the queries on Vietnam's stance on AUKUS, Vietnamese foreign ministry spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang emphasized, "The nuclear energy must be developed and used for peaceful purposes and serve socio-economic development, ensuring safety for humans and the environment."¹⁹ In a statement published on March 14, 2023, Malaysia reiterated the importance of all parties within and beyond AUKUS to "fully respect and comply with the existing Malaysia's national regime in relation to the operation of nuclear-powered submarines in our waters."²⁰

Stimulating an Arms Race

During the Cold War, the fierce arms race between the US and the USSR led to worldwide tension. The AUKUS deal is expected to affect the balance of military power in the region, sparking concerns about a potential arms race in the Asia-Pacific. Indonesia has expressed concern over "the continuing arms race and power projection in the region."²¹ While the timing of an arms race is uncertain, countries with security disputes involving AUKUS member countries may take concrete measures to address possible security risks brought about by AUKUS.

China's Potential Response to AUKUS

China has been closely observing developments related to AUKUS and is preparing to address challenges to its core national interests. China intends to work with the international community on various aspects to promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific and globally. Here are the approaches China can take to achieve these goals:

Fostering regional security cooperation processes
The existence of military alliances and other forms of exclusive security alignment will inevitably give rise to mutual suspicions and even confrontations between aligned and non-aligned countries. As agreed by many regional countries, future peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific cannot be achieved without inclusive multilateral cooperation that can build confidence, trust, and even help defuse hostilities and tensions among regional countries.

Supporting ASEAN centrality in regional security
In view of the complexities involved in Asia-Pacific security, ASEAN is the only entity acceptable to almost all stakeholders in the region, making its centrality in regional security indispensable. However, the erosion of ASEAN centrality by AUKUS has brought this into a critical state that needs strong support. By consistently backing ASEAN centrality, China can not only show itself as a responsible country in preserving regional peace and stability, but also win respect from ASEAN countries.

Keeping close communications and consultations on the developments of AUKUS with regional countries
The US-led AUKUS and other exclusive security alignments pose serious risks to regional stability. For assorted reasons, some regional countries may fail to understand the extent of the danger. Thus, it is of immense importance for China and other regional countries to engage in serious dialogue on the issue.

Strengthening the NPT regime and preventing nuclear proliferation
The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine deal, involving two nuclear-weapon states and one NNWS, clearly violates the commitments they made as members of the NPT. Other NPT member countries have the legitimate right to ask for transparency and relevant regulatory measures to ensure the NPT regime is kept intact. In this regard, installing a proper and effective monitoring procedure is critical.

Properly handling territorial and maritime disputes with neighboring countries
Due to historical and other realistic reasons, there are some disputes between China and neighboring countries, and the US has been exploiting these disputes to amplify the so-called "China threat." Effective measures are needed to end the cycle of tensions, calling for strategic wisdom from both China and relevant countries.

Last but not least, maintaining the momentum of improvement in China-US relations
The driving force behind AUKUS is the US. As long as a stable and predictable bilateral relationship is kept, the future development of AUKUS and its negative impacts can be better controlled. This calls for strategic communications that can effectively manage and control existing and potential disputes between China and the US.

In short, AUKUS and other US-led exclusive security alignments pose realistic and potential risks to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. China will join hands with the international community to meet the challenges ahead.

 

1. The White House, Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS, September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/.

2.Susannah Patton and Jack Sato, "Asia Power Snapshot: China and the United States in Southeast Asia," Lowy Institute, 20 April, 2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/asia-power-snapshot-china-united-states-southeast-asia.

3. Sharon Seah et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2023 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2023), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/The-State-of-SEA-2023-Final-Digital-V4-09-Feb-2023.pdf.

4. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, October 12, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.

5. The White House, National Security Strategy.

6. Lloyd Cox, Danny Cooper, and Brendon O'Connor, "The AUKUS Umbrella: Australia-US Relations and Strategic Culture in the Shadow of China's Rise," International Journal 78, no. 3 (August 30, 2023): 307–26, https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231195631.

7. Amanda Trea Phua, "AUKUS: ASEAN's Hesitant Response," RSIS Commentary 2021, no. 157 (October 2021), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CO21157.pdf.

8. Natalie Sambhi, "Indonesia and AUKUS: Steady Pragmatism at Work," Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, September 13, 2023, https://www.apln.network/analysis/commentaries/indonesia-and-aukus-steady-pragmatism-at-work.

9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning's Regular Press Conference on April 9, 2024, April 9, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202404/t20240409_11278689.html.

10. Geoffrey Till, "AUKUS: The Optimal Pathway, One Year in," IDSS Paper 2024, no. 42 (April 2024), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/IP24042.pdf.

11. "Indonesia's Prabowo Reiterates 'Asian Way' to Defuse Tension, Al Jazeera Says," Reuters, May 12, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesias-prabowo-reiterates-asian-way-defuse-tension-al-jazeera-says-2024-05-12/.

12. Nick Bisley, "Asia's Regional Security Architecture: An Australian Perspective," ISEAS Perspective 2022, no. 49 (May 2022), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ISEAS_Perspective_2022_49.pdf.

13. Zack Cooper, "The Era of Coalitions: The Shifting Nature of Alignments in Asia," ISEAS Perspective 2023, no. 7 (February 2023), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/ISEAS_Perspective_2023_7.pdf.

14. Bisley, "Asia's Regional Security Architecture."

15. James M. Acton, "Why the AUKUS Submarine Deal Is Bad for Nonproliferation—And What to Do About It," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 21, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2021/09/why-the-aukus-submarine-deal-is-bad-for-nonproliferationand-what-to-do-about-it?lang=en.

16. Ian Storey and William Choong, "The AUKUS Announcement and Southeast Asia: An Assessment of Regional Responses and Concerns," ISEAS Perspective 2023, no. 23 (March 2023), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2023_23.pdf.

17. Alvin Chew and Sarah Teo, "AUKUS and the Non-Proliferation Debate," IDSS Paper 2022, no. 55 (October 2022), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/IP22055-Chew-Teo-masthead-final.pdf.

18. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Statement on Australia's Nuclear-Powered Submarines Program, September 17, 2021, https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/2937/siaran_pers/statement-on-australias-nuclear-powered-submarines-program.

19. Tu Anh, "Vietnam Spells out Stance on AUKUS," Hanoi Times, September 23, 2021, https://hanoitimes.vn/vietnam-spells-out-stance-on-aukus-318802.html.

20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, Enhanced Trilateral Security Partnership Between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (AUKUS), March 14, 2023, https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/enhanced-trilateral-security-partnership-between-australia-the-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states-of-america-aukus-.

21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Statement.

 

 

Please note: The above contents only represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.

 

This article is from the May issue of TI Observer (TIO), which zooms in on new developments of those minilaterals in the Asia-Pacific and examines how these changes will redefine strategic dynamics and the security situation in the region. If you are interested in knowing more about the May issue, please click here:

http://www.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2024/5/31/1327268243b64df50-7.pdf

 

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