Decoding the Evolving Security Architecture in Asia-Pacific

June 21, 2024

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Introduction

The Asia-Pacific region is characterized by cooperation, where geopolitical interests, trade, commerce, and environmental challenges converge. It is a critical component of the global supply chains, accounting for two-thirds of the world's economic growth, 60% of global GDP, and a strong source and destination for global foreign direct investment (FDI). The region's vital maritime routes further enhance its importance, as they are indispensable for global commerce and energy supply infrastructure. The region also possesses interconnected historical heritages, influenced by a variety of cultures, religions, ethnicities, and social values, all of which shape interactions and perspectives.

 

However, the return of tense bloc politics and escalation, exemplified by US-led military alliances like AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), as well as an invitation for Japan to join AUKUS, termed "JAUKUS," are worrisome developments. Since 2011, when then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the "Pivot to Asia," the US has intensified efforts aimed at containing China. This involved forming a coalition of "like-minded" countries through extended military cooperation and magnifying trivial issues to constrain China. In contrast, China has always played an active role in maintaining regional and global peace, emphasizing win-win cooperation over a zero-sum perspective. This research paper analyzes the current geopolitical and security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region, with a focus on East Asia and relevant evolving minilateral groupings, and explores potential options for China in maintaining peace and stability amidst great power competition and contradictions.

 

Evolving Strategic and Security Landscape in the Asia-Pacific Region

Recognizing the significance of East Asia, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton unveiled the "Pivot to Asia" strategy on October 11, 2011, describing the region as key to developing a regional economic and security architecture.¹ In Southeast Asia, a dominant manifestation of the pivot included developing relations and reviving close links with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, as well as India in the sub-continent. The pivot had several constituents, including a shift in US foreign policy from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, later refined as the "Indo-Pacific." It also included the relocation of naval assets, redeployment of US forces to new locations, and formation treaties with allies and partners in the region.

 

The implementation of the "Pivot to Asia" strategy, along with military posturing and the basing of forces in China's neighborhood, has created anxiety within China. Consequently, the "Pivot to Asia" appears to be a self-fulfilling US prophecy. With the US depicting China as a competitor rather than a partner and keeping "China threat" theory alive, China is incentivized to take defensive countermeasures, on which the US seems to be "doubling down" with an even larger military presence in the region, ultimately leading to a tense, expensive geopolitical situation for all involved.

 

The active aspects of "China containment" are aptly exemplified by offensive military doctrines, posturing, and joint military exercises conducted by the US and its regional allies. Initiatives like AUKUS, the Quad, and the "Indo-Pacific strategy" are testimony to the involvement of regional alliances of "like-minded" countries built to contain China. The establishment of AUKUS, a security alliance comprising Australia, the UK, and the US, is expected to significantly reshape the security framework in the Asia-Pacific region for the foreseeable future. Several new initiatives and defense agreements amongst member countries are being planned to maintain the balance of power and constrain China. The impact and outcomes of the AUKUS alliance's development will heavily depend on its integration with current US alliance agreements in the region and coordination with other regional frameworks, such as the Quad.

 

The evolving security landscape is rapidly becoming a security dilemma, primarily driven by the narrative of the "China threat" spearheaded by the US and its allies. This stratagem magnifies trivial issues that China has traditionally managed peacefully with regional partners. US alliance obligations are in turn overemphasized, creating a false sense of threat to justify the balance of power obligations against China's peaceful development efforts.
 

Great Power Competition in the Asia-Pacific and India's Stance

The US National Security Strategy (NSS) 2017 formalized a fundamental shift in US policy toward China. After almost two decades of involvement in the War on Terror (WoT),² the US declared competition with and containment of China as an explicit national security priority. President Biden's long-awaited NSS 2022 even advanced the notion of competition with China by building an alliance of "like-minded" countries in the region.³ Comparative analyses between the two documents underscore China's prominence in US policy calculus. In the US NSS 2017, China was mentioned 33 times, while in the US NSS 2022, it was mentioned 53 times. This indicates the Biden administration's intention to pursue a zero-sum game and a containment protocol.

 

Another important aspect is India's motivation to become part of US-led alliances in the "Indo-Pacific" by strengthening ties with the US, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Such a venture is aimed at getting India closer to the US alliance for the containment of China. Among these countries, Japan and Australia have been proactive in fulfilling their alliance obligations. Japan has increased its defense cooperation with both Australia and India, while Australia has increased its defense cooperation with Japan, India, and South Korea. Like the United States, all these countries prefer both bilateral relationships and multilateral forums. The US has been at the forefront in posturing minilateral defense cooperation with and amongst Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, with invitations also extended to select others like India and Indonesia.

 

Indian strategists recognize that China is reliant on the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) passing through the Indian Ocean, where India enjoys an advantageous geographic position. The recent upgrading of naval bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as well as Lakshadweep fits into India's strategy of dominating SLOCs. India considers the Quad as another strategic opportunity provided by the US to enhance its regional role.

 

The alliance fits well within the context of China containment policies, a stance that India has willingly embraced. While other nations of the Quad and the broader "Indo-Pacific" region may have interests in the Pacific Ocean, India is considered a lynchpin in fulfilling a greater role in both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. India has therefore embarked on an ambitious plan of engaging at diplomatic and military levels with the countries of the "Indo-Pacific" and participating in US-led initiatives aimed at containing China, while still cooperating with China to draw economic benefits as current bilateral trade volume is beyond 130 billion USD. In essence, India is projecting itself as a balancing actor, maintaining a strategic equilibrium between the US and China to enhance relevance and stature on the global stage.
 

Recent Developments and Implications of Minilateral Institutions

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's desire to engage Japan in the growing number of US-led regional security frameworks has bolstered Tokyo's stance. This strengthens Japan's alliance with Washington and its partnerships with other nations, marking a crucial component of its regional strategy amidst the evolving security landscape.

 

The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia desire collaboration with Japan on cutting-edge technological initiatives within the trilateral AUKUS security arrangements, with the objective of enhancing deterrence capabilities against China. The AUKUS defense ministers have expressed their willingness to include Japan in Pillar II of the security pact, which specifically deals with cutting-edge technology such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, submarine construction, and hypersonic weapons. The group expressed a commitment to providing sophisticated military capabilities to their armed forces and emphasized that involving "like-minded" partners in Pillar II will further enhance this endeavor.⁴

 

AUKUS was formed under the premise of the "China challenge" as a deterrent against China in the Asia-Pacific region. Similarly, the Quad's vision, as outlined during its maiden summit in March 2021, acknowledges each member country's peculiarities and seeks to build on areas of convergence against China. While the Quad and AUKUS address common security challenges faced by alliance partners, AUKUS focuses on "hard power" in the maritime domain, and the Quad complements other domains including intelligence, reorienting value chains of defense industrial bases, and emerging technologies with military applications. The US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit held in Washington on April 10, 2024, is another significant development that paved the way for joint military exercises and defense collaborations, underscoring the pivotal roles of Japan and the Philippines in fulfilling US alliance obligations.
 

Strategic Response by China for Enduring Peace and Stability

In the evolving landscape characterized by US-led alliances fostering zero-sum dynamics and bloc politics, China has been pragmatically maintaining a balanced approach that encourages constructive engagement with all stakeholders.

 

To reach multiple audiences, China should continue to organize joint research projects, conferences, seminars, and talk shows, ensuring wider publicity on major international media platforms in multiple languages. This approach also encompasses leveraging organizations including the UN, as well as regional organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and BRICS. By continuing to actively engage with these organizations, China can demonstrate its soft power and convey its benign intent for common development and the creation of a community with a prosperous shared future. White papers, like those issued on "China's Peaceful Development" and "Belt and Road Initiative," also serve as strong positive communication tools.

 

In a period of heightened tensions, robust engagement between China, the US, and regional countries at bilateral diplomatic and military levels is crucial. Through military exchanges and joint military exercises, countries can be partners in trying to solve major international issues, particularly those concerning non-traditional security issues. Both China and the US must develop a comprehensive understanding of their relationship, following a principle of "managing differences for common development," avoiding confrontation, and taking steps toward building trust. China should continue to proactively engage with regional neighbors, especially those vital for the US "Indo-Pacific strategy," to keep communication lines open and incentivize participation in regional development and investment projects.

 

 

1. Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.

2. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 18, 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

3. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, October 12, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.

4. Demetri Sevastopulo, "US, UK and Australia Say Japan Could Join Part of AUKUS Pact," Financial Times, April 8, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/f93e7d2f-5d60-4f77-88f1-96fc61115378.

 

 

Please note: The above contents only represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.

 

This article is from the May issue of TI Observer (TIO), which zooms in on new developments of those minilaterals in the Asia-Pacific and examines how these changes will redefine strategic dynamics and the security situation in the region. If you are interested in knowing more about the May issue, please click here:

http://www.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2024/5/31/1327268243b64df50-7.pdf

 

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