Navigating AUKUS Pillar II: China's Strategic Responses in Asia-Pacific

June 27, 2024

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In recent years, the most notable shift in the Asia-Pacific region has been strategic realignments, especially with the establishment of AUKUS (a trilateral security partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India). Since their inception, the enhanced cooperation amongst member states has been focused on containing China's influence in the region.

As of mid-2024, the Quad and AUKUS have undertaken various initiatives. The Quad continues to broaden its scope beyond security concerns, emphasizing a multidimensional partnership that includes economic and technological aspects. The organization also works on collaborative infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity within the Asia-Pacific region. These projects are often seen as a counterbalance to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aiming to provide alternative financing and implementation models.

In contrast with the Quad, AUKUS represents a more significant shift in regional security dynamics. AUKUS has a specific and focused approach, primarily centering on military and technological cooperation, whereas the Quad has a broader scope that includes diplomatic, economic, and environmental aspects. AUKUS involves two Pacific powers and a European country, focusing more on direct defense ties and capabilities. In contrast, the Quad includes two Asian powers (India and Japan), which broaden its geopolitical footprint and relevance in Asian geopolitics. AUKUS is seen as more directly confrontational toward China, especially with the provision of nuclear submarines to Australia. AUKUS marks a shift in US global strategy, whereby the US redistributes forces by empowering allied military capabilities around the Asia-Pacific (APAC). The Quad, while also a counter to China, operates more subtly.

Currently, the concept of expanding AUKUS is gaining support in the US, where policymakers describe it as an open and flexible platform that could include more countries in the future by enhancing collaboration on military innovation and advancing shared security interests, as well as deepening technological, economic, and climate cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

This vision presents AUKUS as a complementary force to the existing regional architecture. While the US considers China a threat in the Asia-Pacific, many East Asian nations do not share this view. However, Japan has recently demonstrated a pronounced interest in participating in Pillar II projects under the AUKUS framework, highlighting its technological capabilities with submarines and aircraft. Pillar II of AUKUS is designed to facilitate the delivery and sharing of advanced military technologies among its partners, including hypersonic, artificial intelligence (AI), and cyber technologies. Meanwhile, Pillar I focuses on providing Australia with nuclear-powered attack submarines.

AUKUS and the Quad states view Japan as a reliable partner alongside the US and Australia. Additionally, Japan is actively enhancing its diplomatic and security relations with India, the Philippines, South Korea, and the UK. During a US-Japan summit in April 2024, it was announced that the three AUKUS partners would explore opportunities for cooperation with Japan on advanced capability projects under AUKUS Pillar II. Later, the Secretary of National Defense of the Philippines Gilberto Teodoro and Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles met with Japanese Defense Minister Minoru Kihara and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in Hawaii, where they reaffirmed the potential involvement of Japan in these projects.

More recently, US Senator Jim Risch, with other members of the Foreign Relations Committee, introduced the "Coordinating AUKUS Engagement with Japan Act." This act facilitates the implementation of the AUKUS policy by instructing the designated AUKUS coordinators within the US Departments of State and Defense to collaborate with Japan. They are tasked with consulting with their counterparts in the UK and Australia at a technical level to better comprehend how Japan can enhance the partnership and identify the necessary steps for Japan to swiftly and effectively participate in AUKUS advanced technology projects. Japan's involvement would enhance the technological and strategic depth of AUKUS initiatives, as a key component of AUKUS is improving interoperability of armed forces through joint training exercises and enhanced information sharing.

Additionally, a spokesperson for the British Defense Ministry communicated to the Korean Service of Voice of America (VOA) on May 2 that the UK is actively looking to involve allies and close partners as development on AUKUS Pillar II continues. The UK believes that South Korea is a country with deeply impressive technology, and South Korea has also confirmed its ongoing discussions to join the AUKUS defense partnership. Meanwhile, New Zealand, known for its nuclear-free policy, is contemplating engagement in Pillar II of AUKUS. Although the decision-making process is still nascent, this engagement could be instrumental in aligning strategic interests across the broader Asia-Pacific. AUKUS has also stimulated other strategic considerations.

AUKUS Pillar II represents a new reality and has explicitly signaled its intent to deter China militarily. The responses of regional states to AUKUS are influenced by concerns over potential disruptions to regional stability and their strategic relationships with both the US and China. Many policymakers and analysts have expressed concerns that AUKUS could potentially trigger an arms race and pose additional challenges to regional stability. Furthermore, there are uncertainties surrounding the implementation of AUKUS, which cast doubt on the balance of power and the deterrent effects it might achieve. Over time, more regional actors, including middle powers and smaller states, might find themselves aligning with AUKUS through partnerships or on an issue-by-issue basis.

AUKUS expansion has potential consequences for China. The primary implication for China is containment, especially if it includes other "like-minded" nations in the region or global players interested in Asia-Pacific security. This perception could exacerbate tensions and lead to a more confrontational regional security environment.

Secondly, AUKUS focuses on advanced technology sharing and development, including areas like AI, cyber capabilities, and underwater systems, which could shift regional military balances. The inclusion of advanced submarine technology and other military assets significantly boosts the military capabilities of member countries, potentially prompting China to accelerate its own military modernization and advancements in response.
Diplomatically, as AUKUS expands, it could complicate Beijing's efforts to foster stronger bilateral relationships in the region and could lead to a polarization where several countries might have to choose between aligning with China or AUKUS strategies.

AUKUS expansion could also have indirect economic repercussions for China, particularly if heightened security concerns disrupt trade routes or lead to increased military expenditures among Asia-Pacific nations. Additionally, AUKUS could lead to tighter restrictions or scrutiny over technological and trade flows, particularly in dual-use technologies, affecting China's economic engagements and technology acquisitions.

As the strategic competition between the US and China intensifies, the strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific is likely to become increasingly divided and competitive. Malaysia and other littoral states might explore novel alignments and partnerships. One example mechanism is the Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA) among the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia. This and other mechanisms could strengthen existing security alliances and partnerships that exclude China, such as the Quad. This development could lead to a more divided regional order, with China on one side and AUKUS/Quad-aligned countries on the other.

 

Possible Strategic Response by China

China has already expressed deep concerns and strong opposition to the AUKUS pact, as it views the alliance as fundamentally aimed at promoting containment and military confrontation. China's response to the expansion of AUKUS should be strategic, multifaceted, and aimed at both safeguarding its national interests and maintaining regional stability. Rather than resorting to confrontation, engaging in constructive dialogue with stakeholders is essential to address concerns and find common ground. Here are several suggested approaches that China might consider:

• China could increase diplomatic efforts to engage with AUKUS members and other regional stakeholders. This includes reinforcing diplomatic ties, utilizing multilateral platforms for dialogue, engaging in multilateral forums and initiatives to address common challenges such as maritime security and environmental issues, and promoting a narrative that emphasizes peace and cooperation.

• In response to AUKUS, China could consider bolstering relationships with neighboring countries and regional organizations. By deepening economic, political, and security ties with ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and other groups, China can cultivate a network of supportive relationships that may act as a counterbalance to the influence of AUKUS. China may enhance its strategic partnerships with other regional players and potentially increase support to countries less aligned with the West. This could also include boosting its participation and influence in multinational organizations where it has leverage, such as the SCO and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

• The focus on advanced technologies by AUKUS and the Quad ensures that member states maintain a competitive edge in critical areas of military and economic development. It is crucial for China to responsibly advance its own military capabilities and technologies. China must strengthen its military capabilities to deter perceived threats. This includes investing in areas like cyber defense, space, AI, and naval power. Meanwhile, it is vital that China's military modernization is only seen as defensive. Participating in arms control discussions, hosting military-to-military talks, and engaging in confidence-building measures (CBMs) with neighboring countries could help alleviate regional fears.

• Although AUKUS insists its collaboration on nuclear-powered submarines for Australia will not include nuclear arms, there are concerns about nuclear proliferation in the region. China might use these concerns to leverage its position in international forums and argue against the expansion of such technologies, citing risks to regional stability.

• China's economic influence in fostering regional integration is unmistakable, as evidenced by its extensive investments, trade agreements, and infrastructure projects across Asia. Projects like BRI, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and China's bilateral trade agreements with various Asian nations underscore China's commitment to advancing regional integration through economic means, positioning it as a key driver of economic cooperation and development in the region. Therefore, leveraging its massive economy, China could promote regional economic integration further to create a stabilizing effect.

• Actively seeking resolutions to territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea could significantly reduce regional tensions. Initiatives for joint development, adherence to international law, and participation in conflict resolution mechanisms demonstrate China's commitment to peaceful coexistence.

• China should work on presenting and communicating its policies and actions in a way that counters negative portrayals. Engaging international media, think tanks, and public diplomacy initiatives could help improve China's image and explain its policies more effectively to a global audience.

• Enhancing its soft power through cultural exchanges, educational programs, humanitarian aid, and other soft diplomacy tools could help improve China's standing and influence. There is a need to engage in public diplomacy initiatives to shape a positive image and narrative to promote China's vision of regional cooperation and stability. For China to bolster its technological innovation and competitiveness, there is a pressing need to invest significantly in research and development initiatives.

• China may also start a regional dialogue including ASEAN states and AUKUS partners to mitigate tensions and build trust, potentially within forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum or East Asia Summit. By championing inclusive and cooperative initiatives that address the underlying security challenges of the region, countries can effectively counterbalance the influence of AUKUS and the Quad.

 

AUKUS and the Quad serve to disturb regional balance and challenge China's presence in the region, albeit through different mechanisms, the Quad through a broader and somewhat softer strategy, and AUKUS through direct military enhancement and expansion. Countering AUKUS and the Quad requires a multifaceted approach that prioritizes diplomatic dialogue, multilateral cooperation, and inclusive regional frameworks. By adopting a holistic strategy that combines these elements, China can effectively respond to the challenges posed by the expansion of AUKUS, maintain its strategic interests, and contribute to long-term regional stability.
 

 

 

Please note: The above contents only represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.

 

This article is from the May issue of TI Observer (TIO), which zooms in on new developments of those minilaterals in the Asia-Pacific and examines how these changes will redefine strategic dynamics and the security situation in the region. If you are interested in knowing more about the May issue, please click here:

http://www.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2024/5/31/1327268243b64df50-7.pdf

 

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