The G7 and the New World Order

August 21, 2024

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The Ukraine conflict has made one feature of international relations obvious. The West, including its Eastern allies (Japan and South Korea), is more united than ever, yet simultaneously more isolated from the rest of the world than ever before. With every G7 meeting that passes, this is becoming more evident. The recently concluded G7 summit in Puglia (aka Apulia), Italy, was no exception, despite Giorgia Meloni's efforts to build bridges to the Global South by inviting the leaders of important powers like Brazil, India, and Türkiye.

The diminishing role of the G7 is a structural trend. Since 2018, the BRICS countries have had a bigger share of world GDP in purchasing power parity terms, and the gap has only increased since then.

But politically, the starkest reflection of this structural decline in the power of the G7 is that the West and its Eastern allies have sanctioned Russia for the conflict, but the rest of the world has not. This has come as a shock for many Europeans. The dominant view for a long time in the Old Continent was that due to the soft power of the European Union (EU), if Europe were to be in trouble with Russia, most of the emerging powers, and the US, would come to the rescue, or would at least help or cooperate with Europe, not with Russia. This has not been the case. Quite the contrary, China, which arguably, because of its economic size and political clout, holds significant influence in the Global South, has enhanced, not reduced, its economic and political exchanges with Russia.

This is a reality check for the Europeans and signifies their disappointment when it comes to China. As a high official from the EU told me recently, the Europeans have a strategic partnership with China, but this does not mean much. If you see how your neighbor gets beaten up by a bigger neighbor, and you are scared that this bigger neighbor might come after you afterward, and your strategic friend, rather than stopping this neighbor, maintains business as usual or even enhances its relationship with him, then you know what to expect. The reality is that in February 2022, the EU felt threatened, looked around to see who would come to help, and the only big power that stood by them was again the US. Not only did China "disappoint," India, a democracy and a Quad member, also continued business as usual with Russia. So did Brazil, which is sometimes presented as part of the West. Moreover, Türkiye, a member of NATO and in a customs union with the EU, became the biggest route to evade Western sanctions against Russia.

Of course, most of these countries have their own reasons to behave like this. Russia remains a big country and retains influence. Neither China nor India wants to be on bad terms with their big neighbor. India still remembers the support of the Soviet Union for its independence. China feels more and more under siege from the West and has thus no present incentive to be on bad terms with Russia. As one Chinese international relations scholar told me recently, imagine that China had acted with Ukraine like it did after 9/11. China, like then, could have joined the "international community," condemned the Russian attack against Ukrainian sovereignty, and supported the military efforts to help Ukraine. But would the US have lifted its tariffs, sanctions, and export controls against China? I talked to many US foreign policy experts, and their answers were a resounding "no." So, in many ways, China is stuck with Russia for good and bad. And I am aware that in Beijing and Shanghai there is a debate arguing whether Russia is a strategic asset or a liability for China.

What is clear is that the US wants to contain China, and convince its allies to join it, and the G7 meeting in Puglia is a clear reflection of this. There is a whole page dedicated to China in the final communiqué, and the usual grievances are all there. From a Global South perspective, there are a lot of double standards in this communiqué and in the foreign policy of these nations. There is a solemn pledge to respect and uphold the "rules-based multilateral order," but while this is done in regard to Ukraine, the same cannot be said about the situation in Gaza. The evidence of war crimes against civil population is increasing by the day, but the West, led by the US, is certainly not doing all it can to stop this.

It is also ironic that the communiqué calls for strengthening the World Trade Organization (WTO) when it is the US that is undermining its effectiveness by blocking the renewal of the Appellate Body. The policies of the Biden administration have not changed since the Trump government, and there is no reason to believe that this will change in the future. As a matter of fact, the US has imposed 100% tariffs on Chinese electric cars, without any consideration for WTO rules. So, while the US talks of multilateralism, it certainly does not walk the walk. One does not need to sit in the Global South to see this. The same goes for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The G7 can ask China to respect the UNCLOS, but this demand loses strength by the fact that the US has never signed the UNCLOS in the first place.

So, to sum up, the G7 meets regularly, and its members are more united than ever in the current geopolitical context, but its influence is diminishing. Yes, in Puglia, many leaders from the Global South attended, and this is positive. Bridges need to be built. Cooperation needs to be strengthened. Yet the gap between the Global North and the Global South, between the West and the rest, or between the OECD countries and the Global South, is still widening. The G7, with the US in the lead, needs to realize that the liberal international order of the Washington consensus is long gone, and a new world order is warranted, one where the state will have a more prominent role than in the past because of the return of industrial policy to manage the digital and energy transitions. Yet this world order cannot be based on a "new Washington consensus," as proposed by US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, which would continue to make the G7 the rule maker, and the rest the rule takers. This will not work. This is slowly becoming a consensus in the EU. There is a feeling that the new world order of multilateralism will need to be co-shaped with the Global South.

Yes, it is important to strengthen the G7, maybe it can even be expanded to South Korea, Australia, and Spain, as it is rumored in Washington, D.C., but without the engagement of the Global South, the new world order will not be multilateral, and for the EU, this is vital. Ultimately, it is the Group of 20 (G20) that needs to work. In conclusion, I hope Ursula von der Leyen will have this as a clear priority in her new mandate. 

 

 

Please note: The above contents only represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.

 

This article is from the July issue of TI Observer (TIO), which focuses on the recently concluded 2024 G7 Summit, examining the global governance dilemmas and domestic political challenges faced by the G7 countries, and discussing their efforts to engage Global South countries. If you are interested in knowing more about the June issue, please click here:

http://en.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2024/7/31/135526382bbd6aa96-0.pdf

 

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