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Each Group of Seven (G7) summit brings renewed debate on the group's relevance in today's world. Whilst critics decry the G7 as a relic of the past, others emphasize its importance as a platform to solve critical global issues.
One of the most common critiques leveled against the G7 points toward its exclusive membership combined with an ambitiously wide scope. Indeed, in an increasingly multipolar world, one aspect is strikingly clear: to maintain relevance, the G7 can no longer rely on hegemonic power alone. This has spurred the G7 into a frenzied charm offensive aimed at winning over skeptical nations in the Global South. From the strategic choice of Puglia (aka Apulia) as a symbolic bridge between "East and West" to the thematic focus on international development, the 2024 G7 Summit saw this charm offensive in full force as leaders attempted to disprove accusations of a "West and the rest" trope.
The group's concern over optics signals a desire to assert legitimacy amongst today's crowded international fora. It also hints at a certain self-awareness of the group's waning influence. In an era where the G7 appears as an increasingly bizarre cohort tasked with regulating global norms and governance, it is important to question the motivations behind the group's quest for relevance.
Despite the tendency to assume otherwise, the G7 as an institution is not stuck in time. The G7 itself has carefully and consciously evolved, continually reshaping itself to preserve an increasingly distant past. Put bluntly, the G7 of today exists as a vehicle for maintaining Anglo-European primacy, deeply embedded in a problematic vision for international cooperation that desperately clings to Pax Americana. In unpacking the group's transformation from its humble origins, we see the G7's standing today as a highly strategic political mechanism that runs antithetical to the multilateralism it espouses. It is this underlying motivation that is the G7's Achilles' heel for securing the legitimacy it so desires.
From Economic Forum to Platform for Global Governance
Born from an ad hoc gathering of finance ministers, the G7 was initially envisioned as a forum for heads of state of the world's largest economies to address pressing economic issues of the 1970s, including the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the oil shock, and stagflation. At the time, the group accounted for a majority of global GDP (around 70%),1 making it a practical and representative forum to coordinate economic policy and address these specific challenges affecting its members.
As the initial economic crises that prompted the formation of the G7 subsided, rather than disbanding, the group widened its scope. In the 1980s, the G7 began to take on geopolitical issues, such as the Iran-Iraq conflict and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This scope widened again at the turn of the century as the G7 took a broader aim at global governance. The G7 of today has pushed forward reform of global trade policy, discussed global pandemic response,2 and become increasingly focused on governing global responses to climate change.3
Despite this drastic change in focus, the G7 has remained rigid in structure. Today's G7 is neither economically nor demographically representative of the world, even as its expanded scope covers more multilateral issues. Indeed, as of this year's summit, the G7 accounts for just under half of the global GDP and comprises less than 10% of the global population. The G7 has signaled no intention to expand its membership, opting instead to expand its portfolio of global issues whilst remaining an exclusive club that hearkens back to a different era – and a different purpose, for that matter.
The G7 Rebranded
The G7 was built during Cold War-era bipolarity, and although the group's initial purpose was not one of power politics, its small membership is reflective of a world order driven by Western hegemony.4 As the globe becomes increasingly multipolar, the G7's resistance to change is not a case of anachronism, but rather embodies a conscious strategy to meet shifting global dynamics. Developments that have triggered this evolution include the economic and political rise of once-emerging nations such as India and China, and an increasingly assertive (so-called) Global South deeply skeptical of global governance as it stands today.5
The G7 has developed from a genuine multilateral forum to a political bloc purpose-built to maintain Pax Americana. The G7 no longer indicates a bipolar world per se, but rather reflects a deep-seated belief in restoring world order to one of hegemony. For a group truly intent on securing global cooperation, a crowded international arena should not represent a threat. Yet, it is precisely the G7's concern over its ability to define and regulate – rather than cooperate – that construes this threat for the group.
The G7's political objective has been evident in its public narrative over recent years. The group has justified its legitimacy as a key actor in global affairs by rebranding itself in terms of possessing a moral, rather than economic, right to leadership. Its transition to a values-based cohesion has been particularly evident in the last decade, as the group has become known as an "alliance of democracies."6 In present-day rhetoric, the G7 defines itself as "united by common values and principles" and holding a duty to uphold "freedom, democracy, and human rights."7
The group's revamped narrative ordains itself as the defender of a "rules-based international order," a term that first appeared in the 2016 G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Joint Communiqué and has continued to be a key emphasis of subsequent meetings.8 This year, for example, Italy outlined its intention to use its presidency to focus on defending the "rules-based international system."9 This vague term is synonymous with a US-led world order. Most starkly, during the US-led summit in 2021, American President Joe Biden articulated the G7's purpose in the context of a defining global struggle between "democracy" and "autocracy."
The value-driven purpose of the rebranded G7 implies that, by virtue of their moral supremacy, the leaders of the G7 have the right to define the rules of the road for "the rest." This year's emphasis on including emerging nations in discussions does little to eschew this alarming implication, precisely due to the built-in power imbalance of the summit itself (emerging nations are invited to participate in the summit at the discretion of the G7). Although we cannot know whether G7 leaders truly believe in this moralistic narrative or whether it is a cynical ploy to conceal the political ambitions of the bloc, it remains the case that this rhetoric impacts global cooperation on pressing issues.
The Elephant in the Room
The weaponization of moral leadership can be clearly observed in the G7's language toward China, where moral leadership acts as a strategic "shielding mechanism" to allow for outward – but not inward – accountability. Although not a member of the G7 (despite China being one of the largest economies, the G7 has yet to invite China on the basis of its political system and low GDP per capita), China's relevance to the forum cannot be overstated. Rhetoric at the turn of the century broadly placed emphasis on opportunities for cooperation with China.10 However, over the past four summits, China has gone from an "elephant in the room" to a "chief adversary."11 This has notably been in line with the hardening domestic discourse on China in G7 member nations; for some, it is arguably a symptom of ontological insecurity within emerging multipolarity.12
In this year's summit, the G7 harshly critiqued China for its supposed economic "overcapacity," condemning China for its subversion of a "rules-based international order" and breaking of international "norms" – a clear example of justification through moral leadership. Yet, a closer analysis of "overcapacity" reveals it as a dubious charge more likely to be a cover for Western protectionism, with questionable implications on global efforts to tackle climate change. It is the language of moral leadership that precisely allows these critiques to go unsaid by the forum.
Similar discourse also strategically frames discussions surrounding the G7's Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) initiative. The PGII, originally known as the Build Back Better World (B3W) partnership, was established to counter perceived growing Chinese influence in the Global South through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).13 In launching the B3W, Biden used stark moralistic language to directly contrast the G7's initiative with BRI, stating that the B3W represents "values that our democracies represent, and not autocratic lack of values."14 Here, the G7 presents the Global South with a Manichean choice: Chinese "exploitation" or Western "benevolence."
The problem with such discourse is not in its critique of Chinese economic practices (indeed, the BRI is not without valid and important criticism);15 rather, it is veiled criticism in moralistic, us-versus-them language that pits the G7 and China in a battle of good versus evil, such that the G7 can "do no wrong." This oversimplification harms any genuine effort to secure multilateral cooperation by polarizing discourse and creating an unhelpful (and untrue) binary.
Critiquing China for its lack of engagement alongside the G7's obvious unwillingness to work with China reveals the G7's true purpose as a political bloc. At the same time, simultaneously "inviting" Chinese cooperation in official statements whilst effectively labeling China as an international pariah places China in an impossible position, whereby it is a threat to global peace and prosperity unless it concedes to a "rules-based" (US-led) world order.
Another focus of the summit was China's alleged funding of Russia. This concern was undermined by the language of moral leadership. Commentators of this year's summit were quick to point out the alarming difference between the G7's actions to counter Russia and its insubstantial response to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in which the world has observed blatant violations of international humanitarian law. This is not to draw a moral equivalency between any two wars, but rather to indicate the insincerity and danger of the G7's moral rhetoric, assigning accountability to its rivals whilst shielding itself and its allies from critique.
Beyond the Moral Paradigm
A claim to moral leadership is not problematic in and of itself. It is when this narrative is used to both defend and circumvent the "rules-based order" it claims to protect that it becomes so. Being a democratic system does not entitle a nation to moral leadership; it goes without saying that countries of the G7 must be held as accountable for their actions as others are. We must begin to recognize the G7's moral leadership for what it is: a cover for zero-sum power politics, rather than a genuine effort to cooperate within a multipolar world.
Moving forward, the G7 must reframe its focus in order to secure the legitimacy it desires from "the rest." The G7 can and should be a productive forum for global cooperation. Representing the united front of a historical hegemon, the G7 is in a prime position to lead the transition to a multipolar world order. The G7 should use its platform to engage with rising powers and push forward reforms in international institutions – all with the end goal of setting our existing global architecture up for a new era of global leadership. Of course, doing so will require a monumental shift in strategy that is informed first and foremost by cultural humility.
1. Raffaele Trombetta, Is the G7 Still Relevant? (London: LSE IDEAS, 2024), https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Expert-Analysis/2024-ExpertAnalysis-Trombetta-G7.pdf.
2. G7, Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, June 13, 2021, https://g7g20-documents.org/database/document/2021-g7-united-kingdom-leaders-leaders-language-carbis-bay-g7-summit-communique#section-4.
3. G7, G7 Clean Energy Economy Action Plan, May 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/g7-clean-energy-economy-action-plan/.
4. Mario Holzner, "BRICS Plus: New World Order After the Pax Americana?," wiiw, April 8, 2024, https://wiiw.ac.at/brics-plus-new-world-order-after-the-pax-americana-n-623.html.
5. Michelle Jamrisko and Iain Marlow, "The Global South Breaks Away from the US-Led World Order," Bloomberg, August 8, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-08/india-brazil-and-rest-of-global-south-break-away-from-the-us-led-world-order.
6. G. John Ikenberry, "The G-7 Becomes a Power Player," Foreign Policy, August 31, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/31/g7-geopolitics-alliance-west-democracies-us-europe-japan-free-world-liberal-order/.
7. "About the G7," G7 Italia 2024, accessed July 23, 2024, https://www.g7italy.it/en/about-g7/.
8. G7, G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Joint Communiqué, April 11, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000147440.pdf.
9. "PM Meloni Outlines Italy's Priorities at the Upcoming G-7," Decode39, December 22, 2023, https://decode39.com/8570/pm-meloni-outlines-italys-priorities-at-the-upcoming-g-7/.
10. David E. Sanger, "It's Not Just Russia: China Joins the G7's List of Adversaries," The New York Times, June 15, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/15/world/asia/g7-summit-china-russia.html.
11. Stuart Lau, "China Is the Elephant in the Room at the G-7," POLITICO, June 10, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/10/china-g-7-492714.
12. Gabby Green, "How American Exceptionalism Gave Rise to the China Threat Theory," The Diplomat, April 16, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/how-american-exceptionalism-gave-rise-to-the-china-threat-theory/.
13. David Sacks, "Will the US Plan to Counter China's Belt and Road Initiative Work?," Council on Foreign Relations, September 14, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/will-us-plan-counter-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-work.
14. Joe Biden, transcript of remarks delivered at the Cornwall Airport Newquay, Cornwall, June 13, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/06/13/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference-2/.
15. Nadia Clark, "The Rise and Fall of the BRI," Council on Foreign Relations, April 6, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/rise-and-fall-bri.
Please note: The above contents only represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.
This article is from the July issue of TI Observer (TIO), which focuses on the recently concluded 2024 G7 Summit, examining the global governance dilemmas and domestic political challenges faced by the G7 countries, and discussing their efforts to engage Global South countries. If you are interested in knowing more about the June issue, please click here:
http://en.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2024/7/31/135526382bbd6aa96-0.pdf
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