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For decades, NATO has been the cornerstone of European security. It was conceived as a response to the Soviet threat during the Cold War, ensuring that Western Europe remained free from Soviet domination. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO did not dissolve but rather expanded. Former Warsaw Pact nations and former Soviet republics like the Baltic states, eager to solidify their independence from Moscow, sought NATO membership as a means of securing their sovereignty. This expansion was seen by many as a logical extension of NATO's mission to promote stability and security in Europe.
However, debates arose around NATO's purpose after the Soviet threat dissipated. Critics argued that without a clear adversary, NATO's relevance had waned. Yet, the resurgence of Russian assertiveness, particularly with the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the 2014 Crimea crisis, and the 2022 Ukraine conflict, reinvigorated NATO. Once again, Russia is viewed as a significant threat, and NATO has responded by strengthening its commitments to member states, proposing membership to new states, and even expanding its reach beyond Europe into the Asia-Pacific.
A Realist Take
Political scientists John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz offered insights into the underlying forces driving NATO's growth. According to Mearsheimer, the expansion of NATO was a rational response to the anarchic nature of the international system, where states sought to maximize their security and power. From this perspective, NATO's expansion is not merely a response to Russian aggression but a strategic move to maintain American primacy in the post-Cold War world. Waltz's balance-of-power theory further explains the dynamics at play. As the global hegemony enjoying moments of unipolarity after the Cold War, the US had to ensure that no other power could challenge its dominance. NATO, functioning as an instrument of American foreign policy, served to inhibit the emergence of a rival power in Europe or Asia. This viewpoint sheds light on why NATO has persisted in its expansion, even without the presence of an immediate and obvious threat like the Soviet Union.
From Russia's perspective, however, NATO's eastward expansion is a direct threat to its sphere of influence, leading to heightened tensions culminating in the current conflict in Ukraine. Russia's narrative that NATO's expansion provoked its aggressive actions has gained some traction, even outside of Russia. This narrative has allowed Russia to frame NATO as an aggressor, justifying its own military intervention in a neighboring country.
NATO's Focus on China
In recent years, NATO has increasingly turned its attention to China and the broader Asia-Pacific region, largely at the behest of the United States. NATO officially pointed to China as one of the alliance's "challenges" and a security concern in 2019, shifting away from its traditional emphasis on Europe.1 NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that "for the first time in NATO's history, we will … address the rise of China." Many scholars agreed that the deteriorating relations between China and the US prompted the US to urge NATO to directly confront China, driven by concerns that China could outpace the US in technological advancements.2 In 2019, Mike Pompeo, then-US Secretary of State, warned that if European NATO members did not exclude Chinese systems from their security networks, the US would be unable to share certain information with them.3
Since then, NATO has continued to characterize China as a security challenge, particularly in the face of growing cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept identified Sino-Russian collaboration as a significant challenge, with China being labeled a "systemic challenge" at the 2023 Vilnius Summit. More recently, the 2024 Washington Summit Declaration deployed stronger language against China, calling it a "decisive enabler" of Russia in Ukraine and explicitly identifying Beijing as part of the threat to the Euro-Atlantic region.4 This change in focus has sparked debate over NATO's future direction and its ability to manage threats beyond its traditional Euro-Atlantic domain.
China, for its part, has reacted ambivalently to NATO's increased attention. Although Beijing has not openly endorsed Russia's territorial ambitions, it has also refrained from condemning them, choosing instead to strike a balance that preserves its strategic ties with Moscow while steering clear of direct conflict with the West. This careful stance aligns with China's broader geopolitical goals and its intention to avoid entangling itself in conflicts that could disrupt its own development.
Labeling China as a "systemic challenge" and a "threat" represents a new episode, an enduring conversation within NATO itself about whether NATO should be a "dynamic" or a "static" alliance.5 In other words: should NATO legitimize itself as an alliance concentrated on its European deterrence mission and avoid deviating from its original purpose? Or should NATO remain flexible and respond to evolving global threats? A significant pivot toward China and the Asia-Pacific suggests a departure from European security priorities, profoundly reshaping NATO's mission and expanding its geographical focus.
A Global NATO? History of NATO Overexpansion
The 2023 Vilnius Summit reinforced NATO's focus on the Asia-Pacific region. That meeting introduced customized partnership programs for the "Asia-Pacific 4" (Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and the Republic of Korea). While NATO officials emphasized that it remained primarily an Atlantic alliance, this has not prevented member states from developing their own Asia-Pacific strategies.6
European members are less enthusiastic than the US about confronting China, which has caused some tension within NATO. For example, the suggestion to establish a NATO liaison office in Tokyo drew significant pushback both within the alliance and externally—French President Emmanuel Macron criticized it as overstepping NATO's bounds, while China issued a statement declaring that NATO is "not welcomed" in the Asia-Pacific region.7
However, NATO's pivot to and potential involvement in the Asia-Pacific is not the first time NATO has acted like a global alliance and engaged in "mission creep," taking it beyond its commitment to European security at the wish of the United States. After extensive debates about the future of American internationalism in the post-Cold War era, the US not only reaffirmed its commitment to NATO but also initiated programs for its renewal and expansion. NATO broadened its scope by engaging in "out of area" operations in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya.8 In 2001, the US invaded Afghanistan as part of the War on Terror with the full support of NATO states, many of which committed "boots on the ground." The United States formulated a doctrine addressing "new threats" that expanded NATO's role beyond just military responses, incorporating effective strategies for resolving disputes and coordinating foreign and political policies.9
In August 2003, NATO officially assumed control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan and committed to a security-force training role in Iraq. At the time, NATO's actions were more about preserving alliance solidarity than pursuing shared geostrategic interests.10 What should have been a primarily "overwatch" military operation escalated into a war that NATO could not afford to lose. It is unsurprising that European leaders struggled to reach a consensus on NATO's security interests in Afghanistan. European countries recognized that their direct interests in the region were limited but felt compelled to support the United States in maintaining alliance unity during a challenging period.
In addition, NATO's 2011 military intervention in Libya sparked controversy due to its failure to outline what the intervention's objectives were. Although the intervention was framed under the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine, many argued that regime change was NATO's actual priority—though it did not follow from this that NATO failed to protect the Libyan population from Muammar Gaddafi regime's responses to uprisings.11 NATO's shift in objectives during the Libya intervention raised doubts about the legitimacy of both the operation and NATO as an organization.
NATO's emphasis on regime change in the Libyan conflict has been portrayed as a form of US-backed imperialism. According to Maximilian Forte, a professor of anthropology at the Concordia University, Canada, the establishment of the Africa Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) in 2002 laid the groundwork for the prioritization of regime change.12 The ensuing creation of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) allowed "a more comprehensive US approach in Africa, and establishment of US Army Africa enables AFRICOM to more effectively advance American objectives for self-sustaining African security and stability."13 AFRICOM's mission was described as consisting of "Diplomacy, Development, and Defense," however, Forte argued that without "window-dressing" AFRICOM's mission was "infiltrate, enlist, and expropriate." This observation was significant, as there was clear evidence suggesting that the United States was both concerned about Libya's influence and seeking ways to diminish Gaddafi's leadership, while also focusing on the "absolute imperative to secure African resources for the United States' own interests."14 Prior to NATO's intervention, Libya produced some 1.6 million barrels a day and boasted Africa's largest proven crude oil reserve. Therefore, if Libya's leader favored other nations over the United States in opposition to AFRICOM, this could provide an underlying justification for the US to back regime change, effectively involving NATO in a strategy that might have otherwise been met with skepticism by its members.
The NATO Dilemma
When US President Joe Biden introduced AUKUS, a defense alliance that seeks to involve Britain and Australia in a wider US initiative to counter Chinese influence, it implicitly posed a challenging question for Europe: Which side will you choose?15 European members have long favored maintaining a stable relationship with the US and China, allowing them to balance their interests between the two powers and achieve the "strategic autonomy" frequently advocated by Macron. While many NATO members do not share Washington's eagerness to confront Beijing, the US is determined to frame it as a crucial next step for the alliance.16 As a result, the current sharp US pivot to Asia under the Biden administration is provoking a moment of choice, requiring European allies to decide whether they are willing to follow the US steps in the Pacific, which simultaneously raises questions about the cohesion and purpose of NATO as well as the necessity for the US to remain committed to the alliance, a question that has arisen as both Democratic and Republican presidents have proposed modifying America's formerly iron-clad commitment to European security.
Indeed, one of the primary challenges NATO faces is tension within the alliance regarding the United States' leadership role. Historically, the US has been the leading force in NATO, but recent years have seen fluctuations in American commitment. Former US President Barack Obama's "Pivot to Asia" in 2011 signaled a shift in focus away from Europe, and former US President Donald Trump's antagonistic stance toward NATO further strained relations. Trump's questioning of US commitments to NATO, particularly regarding defense spending, raised concerns about the future of NATO, concerns that increased as report went that Trump might consider withdrawing the US entirely from the alliance.
Trump's transactional approach to foreign relations left US allies with profound unease, particularly vis-à-vis its NATO allies. Conventionally, previous US administrations had worked to maintain what scholars called a grand strategy of "liberal hegemony," where the US sought to maintain its hegemonic status by leading a "rules-based international order" defined by multilateral institutions and free trade, working to ensure its alliance network benefit from and stay within the US-led order. However, Trump seemed to disregard the US commitment to the order in favor of a purely transactional approach. Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT, US, argued that Trump departed from his predecessors by creating an "illiberal hegemony," where he withdrew from various multilateral trade agreements, upholding his money-first principle. At a 2018 NATO alliance summit, Trump reportedly asked his advisors whether the US should "make history here" and "pull out of NATO."17 Moreover, Trump did not endorse Article 5 of NATO's North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an attack against one is an attack against all. During his presidency, Trump's lack of commitment to his European allies left most of them in distress. At a campaign rally in February 2024, Trump said he would encourage Russia to do "whatever the hell they want" to NATO member countries, and said "everybody's gonna pay," re-emphasizing his transactional politics.18 The world is now standing at a crossroads between the return of Trump's faux isolationism or what Posen called "illiberal hegemony" and the conventional American grand strategy represented by Kamala Harris, Vice President of the US and the Democrats' candidate for the 2024 US presidential election. Uncertainties regarding US commitment to NATO now pose serious challenges for the alliance.
The Biden administration has attempted to reaffirm the US commitment to NATO, but challenges remain. The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and tensions in the Asia-Pacific region have all tested NATO's cohesion and purpose. Additionally, the US strategic focus on China, especially through initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Strategy, has created friction with European allies who are less inclined to view China as a direct threat.
NATO's expansion, particularly into areas traditionally considered outside its purview such as the Asia-Pacific, has been the subject of concern among European members. While the US pushes for a more global NATO, European members are wary of overextending the alliance's resources and focus. The potential for NATO to become embroiled in conflicts in the Asia-Pacific, where China's influence is strong, could divert attention from more immediate threats in Europe, such as Russia's actions in Ukraine. Furthermore, NATO's focus on China risks exacerbating global tensions and potentially sparking a new arms race. Using NATO to counter China may undermine global stability, especially if it leads to increased militarization in the Indo-Pacific.
While NATO has undoubtedly played a crucial role in ensuring European security, its future is uncertain as it faces new challenges and shifting global dynamics. The alliance's emerging focus on China, driven largely by the United States, risks diverting attention from more immediate threats and could destabilize global security. As NATO continues to evolve, it must carefully balance its traditional role of collective defense with the realities of a multipolar world where new powers are rising, and old alliances are being tested.
1. "NATO Recognizes China 'Challenges' for the First Time," DW, March 12, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/nato-recognizes-china-challenges-for-the-first-time/a-51519351.
2. Jeffrey H. Michaels, "'A Very Different Kind of Challenge'? NATO's Prioritization of China in Historical Perspective," International Politics 59, no. 6 (July 16, 2021): 1045–64, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00334-z; Sten Rynning, "NATO's Struggle for a China Policy: Alliance, Alignment, or Abdication?," Asian Affairs 53, no. 3 (May 27, 2022): 481–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2022.2074729.
3. Sherisse Pham, "The US Is Stepping Up Pressure on Europe to Ditch Huawei," CNN, February 12, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/11/tech/huawei-mike-pompeo-hungary/index.html.
4. Ken Moriyasu, "NATO Labels China a 'Decisive Enabler' of Russia's War Efforts," Nikkei Asia, July 11, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/NATO-labels-China-a-decisive-enabler-of-Russia-s-war-efforts.
5. Veronica M. Kitchen, The Globalization of NATO (London: Routledge, 2010), 322.
6. Benedict Baxendale-Smith and Jason Moyer, "NATO Needs Allies in Asia but Does It Need an Indo-Pacific Presence?," South China Morning Post, May 6, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3261440/nato-needs-allies-asia-does-it-need-indo-pacific-presence.
7. Stuart Lau and Laura Kayali, "Macron Blocks NATO Outpost in Japan amid Chinese Complaints," POLITICO, July 7, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-block-nato-outpost-japan-china-complaints/.
8. Yanan Song, "Ironclad US Commitment to NATO? From NATO Expansion to the Ukraine Crisis," Cogent Social Sciences 10, no. 1 (December 8, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2282734.
9. Song, "Ironclad US Commitment."
10. Michael Clarke, "The Global NATO Debate," Politique étrangère (May 2009), https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2009-5.htm.
11. Matthew Green, "To What Extent Was the NATO Intervention in Libya a Humanitarian Intervention?," E-International Relations, February 6, 2019, https://www.e-ir.info/2019/02/06/to-what-extent-was-the-nato-intervention-in-libya-a-humanitarian-intervention/.
12. Maximilian Forte, Slouching Towards Sirte: NATO's War on Libya and Africa (Montréal, Québec: Baraka Books, 2012).
13. William B. Garrett, Stephen J. Mariano, and Adam Sanderson, "USAFRICOM and the US Army in Africa," US Army, February 26, 2010, https://www.army.mil/article/35030/usafricom_and_the_u_s_army_in_africa.
14. Forte, NATO's War.
15. Steven Erlanger, "The Sharp US Pivot to Asia Is Throwing Europe Off Balance," The New York Times, September 17, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/world/europe/biden-china-europe-submarine-deal.html.
16. Eli Stokols and Tracy Wilkinson, "'Watch Me.' Biden Assures NATO Allies After Trump Mocked Alliance as 'Obsolete,'" Los Angeles Times, June 14, 2021, https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-06-14/biden-heads-to-nato-for-bridge-building-after-trump-mocked-alliance.
17. Isaac Arnsdorf, Michael Birnbaum, and Josh Dawsey, "Trump Didn't Quit NATO, but a Potential Second Term Alarms Allies," The Washington Post, February 19, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/02/19/trump-nato-russia-republicans-europe/.
18. Kate Sullivan, "Trump Says He Would Encourage Russia to 'Do Whatever the Hell They Want' to Any NATO Country That Doesn't Pay Enough," CNN, February 11, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html.
Please note: The above contents only represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.
This article is from the August issue of TI Observer (TIO), which delves into the mixed messaging evident between the 2024 NATO Summit and the Paris Olympics, exploring the geopolitical implications of NATO's expansionist agenda and the observable tensions during the Olympic Games, while looking ahead at the prospects for international cooperation amidst these growing challenges. If you are interested in knowing more about the August issue, please click here:
http://en.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2024/8/31/1038537745b0bb03f-1.pdf
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