The Decline of US Hegemony and the Rise of Open Source AI

April 11, 2025

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Introduction

On March 13, 2025, Sam Altman - the founder of US artificial intelligence (AI) giant OpenAI - accused China's DeepSeek of political ties with the Communist Party of China and being "state controlled."¹ He then proceeded to argue that DeepSeek should be banned. This outburst speaks volumes of both the immense financial pressure that has unfolded onto OpenAI as a result of DeepSeek's emergence and the deep transformations that are taking place in the technological contours of the world, which enables Altman to cast this narrative.

The global technological landscape is at a critical juncture. For decades, US technology firms, backed by extensive state support, have functioned as de facto "global technology," shaping digital infrastructures, software ecosystems, and intellectual property regimes worldwide. This dominance, however, is now facing significant disruption, particularly with the rise of open source AI models, exemplified by China's DeepSeek. The emergence of alternative technological ecosystems, coupled with an increasing global pushback against proprietary, rent-seeking models, has challenged the long-standing structures of US technological and financial hegemony.

The Political Economy of US Tech Dominance

The dominance of American technology firms is not merely the result of market competition but is deeply rooted in the political economy of state-backed corporate power. This system has been upheld by several key mechanisms:

State-Sponsored Innovation and Corporate Profiteering

Silicon Valley's dominance in the global technology sector is inseparable from the historical and ongoing backing of the US state. Far from being a purely private-sector phenomenon, the success of American technology firms has been built on extensive state investment in research, infrastructure, and talent development. The Department of Defense (DoD), the Pentagon, and agencies like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have played a pivotal role in funding foundational technologies - including the internet, GPS, semiconductors, and AI. The role of state-backed funding in shaping the commercial success of major technology firms cannot be overstated.

Beyond direct government contracts, US federal funding has also flowed through key university partnerships, with institutions such as Stanford, MIT, and Berkeley serving as incubators for technological breakthroughs that would later be commercialized by Silicon Valley giants. These institutions have been instrumental in developing the human capital and technical expertise that sustain the American technology ecosystem. Many of the key figures in the rise of Silicon Valley, including the founders of Google, Apple, and Nvidia, directly benefited from government research funding, either through grants, defense projects, or university initiatives.
Even today, the US state remains the bedrock of Silicon Valley's continued dominance. The American government not only provides crucial funding for AI and quantum computing but also actively shapes the regulatory environment to favor domestic tech giants. State-backed investments in cybersecurity, chip manufacturing (such as the CHIPS and Science Act), and military-related AI ensure that US firms maintain an edge over global competitors. The symbiotic relationship between the American state and its leading technology firms means that Silicon Valley functions not just as a commercial hub but as a strategic pillar of US geopolitical influence.

Intellectual Property as a Tool of Economic Control

A defining feature of US tech dominance is the aggressive use of intellectual property (IP) laws. The global enforcement of US IP regimes has allowed American firms to capture profits by controlling key software ecosystems and digital infrastructures. These protections have prevented many nations from developing independent technology industries, keeping them dependent on American platforms.

This system operates through rent-seeking mechanisms, where corporations leverage IP protections to extract ongoing revenue streams rather than simply profiting from the initial sale of a product or service. Patents, copyrights, and software licensing structures create artificial scarcity, allowing a small number of firms to consolidate market power and charge exorbitant fees. This dynamic aligns with what some scholars describe as "techno-feudalism" - a system in which monopolistic technology firms act as digital landlords, collecting economic rents through control over data, software, and digital platforms rather than through productive enterprise.

Legal scholar Katharina Pistor, in The Code of Capital, argues that IP laws function as a modern extension of capital accumulation, transforming intangible assets into legally protected wealth-generating instruments. This codification of capital ensures that technological advances remain concentrated within a handful of corporate entities, reinforcing global inequalities and stifling the ability of other nations to build competitive alternatives.

Data Sovereignty and Digital Imperialism

Another critical aspect of US tech hegemony is its control over global data flows. The dominance of American cloud computing providers (Amazon AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud) and software ecosystems (Windows, iOS, Android) has given US institutions, including intelligence agencies, broad access to global data. As highlighted in Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman's Underground Empire, this digital infrastructure functions as a mechanism of geopolitical control, allowing the US to monitor economic, political, and social developments worldwide.

One of the most striking manifestations of this control is the overwhelming dominance of data centers in Northern Virginia, through which an estimated 70% of global internet data flows. Although this figure is gradually declining due to the rise of alternative regional data hubs, Virginia remains the world's largest data center corridor, with deep integration into the American intelligence and defense infrastructure. The US also dominates global communications networks, both terrestrial and submarine. Submarine fiber-optic cables - many of which are operated by American companies or allies - are the backbone of international data exchange, and their control enables the US to enforce extraterritorial surveillance and economic sanctions.

In space, the emergence of Starlink, a privately owned but government-subsidized satellite communications network, further consolidates US control over global internet access. Starlink's rapid expansion has been financed in part by US government contracts, making it an extension of American geopolitical influence. The ability to provide or deny high-speed internet access to entire regions grants the US government and its allied corporations an unprecedented level of strategic leverage, particularly in conflict zones or areas where traditional communications infrastructure is weak.

Counter-Movements and Alternative Ecosystems

Despite the deeply entrenched power of US tech, resistance has gradually emerged. This counter-movement has taken both domestic and international forms, challenging the foundational assumptions of proprietary technology.

The Open Source Movement and Domestic Challenges

Within the US and globally, the open source community has long advocated for decentralized, transparent, and collectively maintained technology. Platforms such as Linux, Apache, and RISC-V have demonstrated that high-performance computing environments do not require proprietary models. However, without the backing of major corporations, many open source projects struggled to achieve mass adoption.

The historical evolution of open source software from the "fringes" to its increasingly central role in global technology can be traced through several key phases, each shaped by technological, economic, and cultural factors. Here's a detailed look at how open source software has grown from a niche hobby interest to a mainstream player in global innovation.

Origins and Early Days (1960s-1980s)

Open source software has roots that go back to the early days of computing, when software was typically shared freely among researchers and academics. In the 1960s and 1970s, as mainframe computing began to emerge, there was an ethos of collaboration. Universities and research institutions shared software code without any commercial aspirations. The term "open source" wasn't coined yet, but the foundational practices of sharing code were already in place.

In the 1980s, the rise of proprietary software, particularly in the context of companies like Microsoft and Apple, began to shift the dynamics. The Free Software Foundation (FSF), founded by Richard Stallman in 1985, was a significant turning point. Stallman's creation of the GNU General Public License (GPL) in 1989 aimed to ensure that software remained free and that users could access, modify, and share code. However, these early open source initiatives existed in the margins, often seen as a counterpoint to the proprietary models that dominated the software industry.

The Rise of the "Hacker Culture" and the Internet (1990s)

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of the "hacker culture" and the rise of the internet. Linux, developed by Linus Torvalds in 1991, marked a major milestone in the growth of open source. Linux gained traction as a freely available, powerful operating system, particularly among universities and developers, further cementing the open source ethos.

Despite its technical success, Linux and other open source projects were still largely seen as the domain of enthusiasts, hobbyists, and academics, with limited mainstream adoption. The internet enabled communities of developers to collaborate more easily, and tools like Git, created by Linus Torvalds in 2005, revolutionized code sharing, making collaboration even more efficient.

Open Source and the Dotcom Boom (Late 1990s-Early 2000s)

By the late 1990s, the rise of the dotcom boom helped bring open source software into the corporate spotlight. Companies like Red Hat and Apache were key players in this phase. Red Hat, founded in 1993, was a notable example of how open source software could be monetized through support, training, and consulting. The Apache Software Foundation, formed in 1999, also played a pivotal role in advancing open source web server technologies, contributing to the widespread adoption of open source software in enterprise environments.

However, open source was still not considered the go-to solution for mainstream businesses, especially compared to proprietary software from giants like Microsoft, Oracle, and IBM. Many still viewed it as lacking the polish, support, and commercial backing needed for critical business applications.

Commercialization and the Mainstreaming of Open Source (2000s)

The 2000s saw a shift in the relationship between open source and commercial companies. Open source became increasingly seen as a cost-effective alternative to proprietary software. Companies like Google, Facebook, and Amazon started adopting and contributing to open source projects, not only for the technological benefits but also as a way to engage with developer communities and influence industry standards.

For example, Google's creation of the Android operating system, which was based on open source software, was a major milestone in the mainstreaming of open source in the mobile computing space. The success of Android demonstrated that open source could power large-scale commercial applications, leading to wider corporate adoption.

During this period, the concept of "open core" models emerged, where companies could provide open source software for free but offer premium, paid versions with added features or support. This hybrid model allowed open source projects to become more sustainable financially and to integrate with mainstream commercial operations.

The Blockchain Era and the Rise of Open Source Culture (2010s-2020s)

In the 2010s, the advent of blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies brought open source software to a new cultural and economic forefront. Blockchain technologies like Bitcoin and Ethereum, which are built on open source principles, popularized the concept of decentralized, community-driven innovation. Open source software became more than just a way to share code; it became a model for building trust, transparency, and collaboration in the digital economy.

At the same time, the global interest in open source technologies was accelerating, driven by the growing need for digital transformation in enterprises and the increasing reliance on cloud computing. Companies realized that open source software offered flexibility, security, and cost savings, all of which became crucial in the rapidly evolving technological landscape.

Open source standards and platforms also gained ground as global players, particularly in the hardware domain. China's growing commitment to open source initiatives played a key role in the acceleration of open source adoption in the 2010s. Chinese tech giants like Huawei, Alibaba, and Tencent made significant contributions to open source repositories and supported open source design standards, particularly in areas like chip design and cloud infrastructure.

Huawei's participation in open source communities, with over 100 repositories on GitHub, and its involvement in the development of open source hardware platforms like RISC-V, is a strong example of how Chinese companies have increasingly integrated open source models into their corporate strategies. This shift has not only helped to elevate the status of open source technologies but also signaled a broader geopolitical shift in how technology standards are set and controlled.

The Current Era: Open Source as the New Norm

Today, open source software occupies a central position in the global technology ecosystem. Major enterprises, governments, and academic institutions alike have embraced open source solutions across a wide array of industries, from cloud computing to artificial intelligence to blockchain. Open source contributions are increasingly seen as a critical element of corporate innovation and strategy, with companies large and small recognizing the benefits of engaging in open source communities.

One of the key factors driving this transition has been the increasing reliance on cloud infrastructure, where open source technologies like Kubernetes and Docker play a foundational role. These technologies have become integral to the deployment and management of modern applications, further cementing open source as the backbone of many of today's technological innovations.

The active participation of Chinese companies in open source standards communities has also contributed to reshaping global open source ecosystems, highlighting the international nature of this movement and signaling a shift away from Western-dominated technology norms. This growing commitment to open source from Chinese companies suggests a new phase of global technological collaboration and competition, where open source models of development and innovation are likely to continue playing an essential role.

China's Alternative Model: Competition and Public Good Technology

Against this backdrop, China has pursued a markedly different approach to technological development, emphasizing competition across the tech supply chain and the development of publicly accessible technology. Unlike the US model, which prioritizes monopolistic corporate dominance, the Chinese government has actively fostered competition within its tech sector while imposing regulatory constraints to prevent unchecked rent-seeking.

China has also focused on building an independent technology supply chain that spans raw materials, manufacturing, and semiconductor production. The country has heavily invested in rare earth minerals extraction and processing, ensuring that it has access to the critical raw materials needed for advanced electronics. In hardware manufacturing, Chinese firms such as SMIC and Huawei have made significant strides in semiconductor production, narrowing the gap with Western chipmakers. This progress threatens to disrupt the legacy semiconductor industry, as China's entry into mature semiconductor markets could lead to abundance of supply, reducing profitability for incumbents like Intel and TSMC.

Additionally, China is developing an alternative satellite network, the Qianfan project, which will rival Starlink. Unlike Starlink, which is privately owned but backed by US government contracts, Qianfan is being developed as a state-supported initiative that aligns with China's long-term strategy of reducing dependence on Western-controlled digital infrastructure. This satellite network will provide an alternative global internet backbone, reducing reliance on American-controlled networks and enhancing digital sovereignty for participating countries.

Open Source AI as a Paradigm Shift

The emergence of DeepSeek as an open source AI model fundamentally shifts the balance of technological power, economic valuation, and geopolitical influence in AI development. This transformation is evident across three key dimensions: technological, business model, and geopolitical.

Technological Dimensions: Efficiency, Accessibility, and the Commons

The release of DeepSeek underscores an important shift in AI development: optimization over brute force. The dominant US model, particularly among firms like OpenAI, Google DeepMind, and Anthropic, has revolved around securing the best hardware (e.g., Nvidia H100s), running ever-larger models, and prioritizing proprietary architectures. This approach assumes that scaling laws continue to provide superior results - more compute, more data, and more parameters yield better performance.

DeepSeek's success disrupts this assumption in several ways:

●Hardware Efficiency: DeepSeek demonstrates that high-end Nvidia chips are not strictly necessary for cutting-edge AI models. Instead, the focus shifts to algorithmic efficiency, pruning, quantization, and architectural refinements to achieve superior performance with fewer computational resources.

●Open Source Foundations: By making their model open source, DeepSeek contributes to AI commons where further innovations can be built collectively. This approach allows for rapid iteration, fine-tuning, and domain-specific improvements without relying on a single centralized entity.

●Decentralized Development: The availability of DeepSeek enables smaller players - including companies, academic institutions, and governments - to deploy AI solutions independently. This reduces reliance on US-led AI platforms and allows countries or industries to tailor AI models to local needs.

Business Model Dimensions: Valuation Risks and the End of Superprofits

The US tech industry's AI business model is largely premised on proprietary foundational models as the core asset driving valuation. Companies like OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic have pursued a moat strategy - building massive closed models and monetizing them through Application Programming Interface (API) access, enterprise licensing, and cloud-based integration. This approach relies on (1) high barriers to entry (through proprietary architectures, specialized chips, and exclusive datasets), (2) subscription-based access models (charging for usage rather than open distribution), and (3) massive investment inflows (venture capital, corporate funding, and government contracts).

DeepSeek and the broader open source AI movement directly threaten this model. It does so by:

●Commoditizing Foundational Model: With open source alternatives available, foundational models become less valuable as proprietary assets. Instead, the value shifts toward application development, fine-tuning, and integration within existing systems.

●Eroding Market Control: The dominance of US firms in AI is partly due to their ability to charge for access to proprietary models. If open source alternatives achieve comparable performance, businesses and developers may choose the free alternative over expensive subscription-based models.

●Increasing Valuation Collapse Risks: AI startups and tech giants have attracted billions in investment based on expectations of future revenue derived from exclusive AI services. If open source models become widely adopted, the perceived value of proprietary AI firms could significantly decline, potentially triggering a repricing of AI assets.

Geopolitical Dimensions: AI Sovereignty and the Decline of US Tech Hegemony

AI is not just a commercial industry - it is a key frontier in global technological competition. The US has maintained a dominant position in AI due to its leadership in foundational models (OpenAI, Google, Meta, Anthropic), control over semiconductor supply chains (via Nvidia, TSMC, ASML), and software and infrastructure dominance (via AWS, Azure, Google Cloud).

This is changing.

DeepSeek's emergence - alongside other open source AI efforts, including models from China, France (Mistral), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) - signals a decentralization of AI power and raises three key geopolitical implications:

1.AI Sovereignty and National Security: Open source AI models allow countries to develop domestic AI capabilities without reliance on US tech giants. This aligns with geopolitical efforts to achieve AI sovereignty, particularly in China, Europe, and the Global South. By reducing dependency on US-controlled AI services, nations can build localized, fine-tuned AI systems on their own terms, without exposure to potential restrictions or data security risks.

2.The End of the US AI Monopoly: The US has attempted to maintain AI dominance through export controls on semiconductors and restrictions on AI collaborations. However, DeepSeek and similar projects demonstrate that hardware restrictions are not a definitive roadblock. By prioritizing efficiency and optimization, alternative AI ecosystems can thrive without access to the latest Nvidia chips. This weakens the effectiveness of US-led technological containment strategies.

3.A Shift Toward Multipolar AI Development: The AI landscape is becoming multipolar, with different regions fostering their own ecosystems. China is advancing its own AI models, reducing reliance on US technology, and fostering an independent innovation ecosystem. Europe is prioritizing regulatory oversight and open source AI efforts (e.g., Mistral) as a counterbalance to both US and Chinese AI models. And, the Middle East (UAE, Saudi Arabia) is investing in AI development as part of broader economic diversification strategies.

This multipolar development suggests that the next wave of AI innovation will not be dominated solely by US tech firms. Instead, a more distributed global AI ecosystem is emerging, challenging the Silicon Valley-centric paradigm.

Financial and Geopolitical Implications

The growing success of alternative technology ecosystems has profound implications for global capital markets and US geopolitical power.

The Vulnerability of US Tech Valuations

The dominance of a handful of technology firms is central to US financial markets. The "Magnificent Seven" tech companies - Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Nvidia, and Tesla - account for a disproportionately large share of the S&P 500's total valuation. This financialization of US tech has led to extreme wealth concentration, with the top 10% of Americans owning 93% of the S&P 500's value and the top 1% controlling nearly half.

Any sustained disruption to US tech dominance could trigger market volatility, leading to significant capital outflows and asset repricing. If open source AI erodes the profit margins of dominant firms, investors may shift capital toward alternative markets, weakening the foundations of US financial power.

US Retaliatory Measures: Protectionism and Economic Warfare

Predictably, the US has responded to these challenges with increased regulatory scrutiny and geopolitical maneuvering. OpenAI's Sam Altman has publicly lobbied against DeepSeek, accusing it of being politically affiliated and demanding its ban. Similarly, policymakers such as US Vice President J.D. Vance have argued that the US should not be constrained in AI development because it is "one of the good guys."

The US may escalate its economic retaliation through sanctions and trade restrictions, such as those levied on Huawei. Chinese AI models could face bans in Western markets under national security pretexts; IP lawfare whereby legal challenges could be used to restrict the adoption of open source models; and capital market constraints so that financial pressure could be applied to discourage investment in non-US AI ecosystems.

However, these measures may have limited effectiveness given that AI models, unlike physical hardware, are intangible and easily distributed. Efforts to restrict access to open source AI could inadvertently accelerate the decentralization of technological power.

The Future: Fragmentation or Realignment?

DeepSeek's open source AI intervention is not just a technological breakthrough - it is a structural challenge to the economic and geopolitical foundations of the current AI industry. It signals the commoditization of foundational models, shifting economic value to applications and domain-specific fine-tuning; a disruption of proprietary AI business models, exposing valuation risks for major US AI firms; and a geopolitical decentralization of AI innovation, reducing US dominance and enabling global AI sovereignty.

The long-term impact will depend on how quickly businesses, developers, and governments adopt open source AI. If DeepSeek and similar projects continue to gain traction, we could see a profound realignment of power in AI, both economically and politically.

The world has reached something of a crossroads. The trajectory of the global technology landscape will likely follow one of two paths:

1.Fragmentation into Competing Technological Blocs: The US and its allies may seek to consolidate a Western-aligned proprietary AI ecosystem while China and other emerging economies develop parallel open source frameworks.

2.A Forced US Realignment Toward Open Source Models: If open source AI proves superior, US firms may be compelled to abandon their proprietary-first approach, integrating open technologies into their business models.

I have previously explored some of these dynamics through the concept of "Digital Westphalia." This idea aims to help navigate an understanding of the shift in global tech power dynamics, particularly in relation to the dominance of US big tech and the rise of more distributed, decentralized technological ecosystems. I draw on the historical concept of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which established the principles of sovereignty and the autonomy of states in international relations. In this modern digital context, "Digital Westphalia" describes the emerging fragmentation of global tech control, with countries asserting greater autonomy over their technological futures, in contrast to the earlier global hegemony of US tech giants.

Under the traditional US big tech model, companies like Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Meta have dominated the development of foundational technologies - cloud services, AI models, data infrastructure, and digital platforms. These companies have shaped the global technological ecosystem, offering universal solutions that enable nations, businesses, and individuals to connect to the internet, access AI services, and participate in the global economy. However, "Digital Westphalia" challenges this paradigm by emphasizing the rise of technological sovereignty. As countries and regions increasingly demand control over their own technological infrastructures and data governance, we see the emergence of technological architectures tailored to local needs.

For example, open source models, like DeepSeek, enable global actors to bypass reliance on US-controlled technologies, fostering local innovation and self-sufficiency. Furthermore, AI and cloud ecosystems are developed and operated within regional boundaries, offering alternatives to US-led services. For example, China's AI landscape, driven by firms like Baidu and Tencent, or the EU's push for a European cloud initiative that emphasizes data privacy and compliance with local regulations.

This decentralization of technology means that we are entering an era where digital sovereignty allows nations to assert greater control over the technological systems that underpin their economies, societies, and governance.

In the traditional model, US big tech firms have dominated the global digital economy by controlling key technological resources - AI models, cloud infrastructure, and access to critical data. This monopoly has allowed American firms to not only profit immensely from the global reach of their platforms but also exert indirect influence over national economies. Superprofits have been generated by charging users, governments, and corporations for access to their infrastructure, services, and proprietary data.

However, in an era of Digital Westphalia, this monopolistic economic model is being increasingly undermined. Open source AI models, such as those represented by DeepSeek, represent a shift toward democratization - where the barriers to entry for AI development are lowered, enabling global competition and innovation outside the US-dominated space. The rise of localized tech hubs and the increasing push for self-sufficiency in critical technologies (e.g., semiconductor manufacturing and cloud services) are reducing the economic power of US tech giants. Nations are now recognizing the value of homegrown solutions that better meet local needs and align with national policy priorities.

This shift also exposes valuation risks for companies heavily invested in proprietary technologies. As foundational models like DeepSeek become more accessible and standardized, the superprofits generated by US tech firms could diminish, leading to asset repricing in the sector. The business model that once relied on exclusive access to powerful technologies is now being questioned, as the value in the AI space increasingly shifts toward applications and specific use cases rather than foundational models.

Just as the Treaty of Westphalia heralded the rise of sovereign states and the decline of overarching religious or imperial powers in Europe, Digital Westphalia marks the decline of the US monopoly over the global tech ecosystem. This transition is being driven by several key factors.

Countries are embracing the possibilities of technological sovereignty, pushing back against US tech dominance by fostering national and regional initiatives. China, for example, has invested heavily in developing its own AI infrastructure, with companies like Baidu and Alibaba focusing on self-reliance and creating localized ecosystems. The EU has also taken steps toward data protectionism, with regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and investments in Europe's own AI and cloud infrastructure to lessen dependence on US tech firms.

The digital sphere has become a new front in geopolitical competition. The US, once the undisputed leader in AI, is now facing competition from China and other rising tech hubs. This isn't a competition between one hegemon and another. Rather, the question is one of paradigm.

As part of their push for digital sovereignty, nations are increasingly asserting control over the data that flows through their borders. Data governance and localized regulatory requirements are emphasizing nation states as the key governance actor, rather than the interests of American big tech. This includes localizing data storage, enforcing data privacy laws, and requiring foreign firms to comply with national rules. This reduces the power that US tech giants have over national economies and weakens the global business model built around cross-border data flow.

In this context, the geopolitical landscape is increasingly shaped by the need to navigate between multiple, often competing, tech spheres of influence. With the emergence of Digital Westphalia, digital sovereignty will become a core component of national security policy, as countries seek to assert control over their technological infrastructures and protect their citizens from external influence.

Multipolar Digital Empowerment

This idea of Digital Westphalia, which I have elaborated on previously, captures the essence of a transformative shift in the global tech landscape. The era of US big tech dominance is giving way to a multipolar digital order, where the control of foundational technologies is more dispersed and decentralized. This shift is characterized by technological sovereignty, where countries develop their own solutions to meet local needs; economic decentralization, with the value of foundational models shifting toward applications development and tailored solutions; and geopolitical realignment, as countries assert their digital sovereignty and move away from reliance on or exposure to US-controlled tech giants.

In this emerging landscape, the power dynamics of the digital world are no longer determined solely by a handful of US-based corporations. Instead, the future of technology is being shaped by a more distributed, regionalized, and diversified global order, aligned with the principles of Digital Westphalia. This new paradigm will likely foster innovation, competition, and cooperation across borders, while also reshaping the geopolitical and economic contours of the 21^st century.

In this sense, the emergence of Digital Westphalia is a corollary of the broader development of China as an "enabling great power." China's rise in the global technology landscape interacts with the broader geopolitical and technological shifts. The changing contours of the global technology landscape and China's role within it open a clear pathway for the Global South to assert greater technological and geopolitical agency. This pathway is marked by the intersection of technological sovereignty, economic decentralization, and strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order.

 

 

This article is from the March issue of TI Observer (TIO), which explores the AI-powered digital economy, analyzing how nations navigate the balance between development and governance, while examining the impact of technological advancements on global competition and the broader international order. If you are interested in knowing more about the March issue, please click here:

http://en.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2025/3/31/14372768c45e0ae0-6.pdf

 

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