An Independent Europe Must Be a Eurasian Europe

May 13, 2025

About the author

 

A recent Financial Times opinion piece by Oren Cass was headlined: Europe Must Choose Between America and China.¹ Cass argues that as the United States pivots to a "great powers"/spheres of influence framing as it retreats from liberal internationalism, in which China is conceded its own sphere, Europe must submit to America's economic demands, for otherwise, "[c]hoosing China would seal [Europe's] fate and ensure continued decline." In effect, Cass is arguing that Europe can ill-afford to "call what it perceives to be a bluff" on the part of Washington, and must accede to the demands of the superpower across the Atlantic.

 

If Cass is correct that Europe's negotiating resources are at a low ebb, I would suggest that the claim that without acceding to the demands of Washington, Europe's decline is ensured is hyperbolic, at the very least. Accepting America's economic demands would further weaken Europe's economic foundations, while exposing Europe to the demands of financing wars that were seeded by the Americans and from which Washington is now washing its hands.

It is doubtless that the US wants its cake and to eat it too, when it comes to Europe. The US no longer cares to carry the financial and resourcing responsibility of NATO - or Europe's protection, and does not seek to bequeath a security architecture that delivers long-term peace in Western Europe. Rather, the Americans seek to do little more than walk away from a military and security debacle, much of it of its own making, and pass the baton onto those Europeans who remain animated by deep-seated Russophobia. A Europe that can keep the Russians occupied is helping neither Europe nor Russia, let alone those remaining residents of Ukraine, but does relieve the Americans to redirect their attention and forces toward priority areas in the Middle East and Asia. To do as Cass argues would consign Europe to the worst of all worlds: to be exposed to a voracious United States focused on harvesting resources for its own use and to relocate capacity on its own shores, at Europe's expense, while being left with the imperatives of increased military commitments.

Rather than accepting this invidious choice, Europe - as a whole, and its individual constituent nation states - can reframe their conditions and strike an altogether different course. Whether the existing cabal of European elites in Brussels are capable of such a radical reordering of priorities is another question, but perhaps reality will force itself on them before too long. Europe does face a choice, but it isn't between America and China. The choice is between being the butt-end of a transatlantic power headquartered in Washington or as a bulwark of a consolidated Eurasian economic continent, in which national security is grounded in the principles of indivisible security.

The Americans Want out of Ukraine, but…

The Americans, under Trump, want out. They see the war in Ukraine as a lost cause and, in any case, have "other fish to fry." The US sees the world through great power rivalry lenses, in which its primary adversary is China.² For Trump, Ukraine, as a proxy, is no longer of use and can be abandoned. Being bogged down in Europe is a distraction and a drain on resources.

That said, the situation is not so clear cut. As much as Trump wants out, or at least says he wants out, the actions of his administration send mixed messages. Trump's administration continues to provide military and intelligence assistance to Ukraine, when the clearest path to ending the conflict would be to desist. Trump's various entreaties - directly and personally with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and indirectly via envoys and surrogates - with Russia may have opened up pathways to resume diplomatic dialogue, but there are no concrete, viable proposals to bring the Ukraine conflict to an end. Normalization of diplomatic relations is one thing, and dialogue on assorted economic matters is another, but the core of the conflict and its terms of settlement remain out of reach of the US.

Trump opened up dialogue with Russia directly and bilaterally. His initiatives did not involve prewarning or canvassing European allies, let alone Zelensky in Ukraine. Some observers have rationalized that going it alone was necessary because both Kiev and Brussels/London would have undermined any moves toward a dialogue for peace. As potential saboteurs, Trump could not afford to bring them to the table for fear that they would ground the initiative before it could even take off. These are, perhaps, tactical considerations but the broader strategic structural problem of not including the allies in any long-term peace settlement must surely have been something that could have been, or should have been, anticipated. Russia has long understood that without the Europeans at the table, there could be no meaningful peaceful resolution to the issues in Western Europe. In December 2021, Russia proposed two agreements: a treaty with the US and an agreement with NATO. Russia clearly understands that a permanent settlement must include all parties.

Yet, not including EU, London, or Ukraine in the discussions with Russia was perhaps a willful decision by Washington ensuring that no viable pathway to peace could be achieved, while mollifying the competing factional ambitions and claims surrounding the White House. Trump may speak of wanting peace in Ukraine, but there are plenty in his circle who are advancing propositions that simply do not contribute toward resolution. General Keith Kellogg's latest proposal, accompanied by a map detailing the freezing of the line of conflict and identifying where European troops would be positioned in Ukraine as a backstop to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), was stillborn. Its conception was tone deaf to Russia's long-stated positions. Talk of ceasefires when Russia's insistence that "root causes" be addressed is ignored makes for a situation in which meaningful talks have ground to a halt.

What hasn't ground to a halt is the advance of the Russian army. Indeed, it has been clear for a long time that the Russian army would prevail in a protracted war of attrition. In doctrinal terms, Russia has demonstrated a capacity to adapt to the realities of the battlefield and reorient its defense and offensive capabilities and resources to suit. It has adapted quickly with new technologies, and has effectively seen off the best weaponry that the West could throw into the conflict. The various rounds of Western Wunderwaffe, ostensibly ready to deliver the knock-out blow, were shown up as expensive and largely ineffective. In human resource terms, the AFU is struggling to recruit and its latest drives have been dismal failures. The West remains reluctant to commit troops formally, though it is now well known that the US and various European states have provided military resources with troops on the ground. The expose of American involvement in the war, in the New York Times,³ may have been a surprise to some in the West, but for those who've followed the conflict closely and kept an open mind to the veracity of the volumes of independent media reportage, that the US was actively fighting the war with personnel aiding and directing the AFU was well-known.

With attempts to coax a ceasefire out of Russia failing, and Trump having initially withdrawn intelligence support to Ukraine in a fit of pique at Zelensky's indolence, the US resumed its military support to Ukraine. Amidst reports that US military aid is running dry,⁴ the capacity for Washington to prolong the engagement is being slowly but surely drained. It is little wonder that they want the Europeans to step in, and soon.

Trump is now confronted with a dilemma. At the assumption of office on January 20, 2025, a short window existed for Trump to withdraw American involvement and extricate the US from the mire, and in doing so, ensure that blame is leveled at anyone else but the Trump administration. Biden is blamed for his incompetence. Zelensky is positioned as an ungrateful fall guy, having squandered military support and financial largesse. The US is ultimately indifferent to whether there's peace on the ground because, as it seeks to maneuver out of Ukraine, it tells the Europeans that they need to muscle up.

That window of opportunity has been closing rapidly. Trump has claimed that the war is "Biden's war," in an effort to distance himself from the strategic defeat. When pressed on why efforts to negotiate ceasefires and peace accords with Russia are going nowhere, Trump reverts to tried-and-true campaign slogans about how the war would not have started had he been President. This may play well to an uncritical domestic base, but these slogans ring hollow in the face of an inability to deliver on the promise of ending the war in 24 hours (or, later, 100 days). Worse, in what perhaps was a fit of braggadocio, Trump reminded that it was he who supplied Ukraine with its first lethal weapon systems in 2017: "I gave you the Javelins to take out those tanks. Obama gave you sheets," he intoned.⁵

The war in Ukraine, along with the strategic defeat that has been unfolding there, is not just Biden's war. Indeed, it's not just Trump's war either. It has been America's war, with the Europeans in tow. Trump's dilemma is to distance himself from a war that he cannot face extricating himself from. The US wants to blame others, while it retreats.

Repeating Pattern

The US has a historical form in this modus operandi. One just needs to look at the experiences of Vietnam and Afghanistan to see the contours of this pattern of foreign policy.

Trump's approach to the Ukraine conflict shares some notable similarities with Nixon's desire to end the war in Vietnam while preserving the illusion of American strength. Nixon blamed the failure of the Vietnam War on previous administrations, particularly the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Trump has sought to shift blame for the Ukraine crisis onto Joe Biden though his ability to sustain this is failing. Trump's rhetoric suggests that America's military involvement, from its early support of Ukrainian sovereignty to the current provision of military aid, is a result of misguided decisions made by others; yet, his Javelin braggadocio moment suggests that it wasn't always others sitting in the driver's seat. He has repeatedly framed the war in Ukraine as a failure instigated by Biden's policies, positioning himself as the alternative to an escalation that could lead to US involvement in a broader conflict with Russia, but has subsequently reminded the world that he was the first to provide the lethal hardware in what can be interpreted as an escalatory move.

In both cases, the US has been reluctant to acknowledge its role in provoking or escalating the conflict. The 1971 Pentagon Papers revealed how successive administrations manipulated public perception of the Vietnam War and concealed the true extent of America's involvement in Vietnam. The disillusionment with American military policy in Vietnam, as well as its eventual withdrawal, was driven by a desire to avoid further military and political casualties, without confronting the moral and strategic failures that led to the debacle. Trump's approach mirrors this, presenting himself as a pragmatic leader who can end conflicts, without confronting the long history of US intervention in the region or the broader geopolitical consequences of such a withdrawal. Trying to be a mediator while being one of the co-combatants is a square that cannot be meaningfully circled.

Success has many fathers; failure is an orphan. So it is with Trump and Ukraine. His rhetoric, especially regarding his role in the early stages of the war, aligns with his broader tendency to claim credit for successes and shift blame for failures. He has boasted of providing Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles during his presidency, a symbolic gesture that links him to Ukrainian military preparedness. However, now that the war has proven disastrous for US interests and the West, Trump's posture is one of detachment. He presents the situation in Ukraine as a miscalculation by Biden, framing the issue as one that could have been avoided had Trump remained in office.

In this way, Trump echoes the behavior of past administrations. In particular, he attempts to abandon responsibility for prolonged military entanglements. Nixon sought to secure a soft exit from Vietnam without accepting the full consequences of its actions. Trump desires to salvage his political image without confronting the moral and strategic blunders that have led to the current crisis.

In each of these conflicts, the US faced the consequences of military overreach, poorly defined objectives, and an inability to extricate itself from entrenched geopolitical struggles. Trump's attempts to distance himself from the failures in Ukraine reflect a pattern seen in previous US military disasters. Like Nixon's attempts to distance himself from Vietnam's collapse and Trump's approach to Afghanistan, the current moment in Ukraine reveals the difficulty of withdrawing from a conflict that the US played a significant role in inflaming.

That's the difficulty of accepting defeat with honor.

Ultimately, the US experience in these conflicts illustrates the complexity of interventionist foreign policy, not to mention the challenges of navigating the political fallout when those interventions fail. This is an American pattern, as ably described by scholars such as Monica Duffy Toft and Sidita Kushi in their 2023 book, Dying by the Sword, which describes America as a "nation addicted to military intervention." Trump's efforts to extricate the US from the Ukraine conflict, while blaming others, are just the latest chapter in a long history of US military misadventures and strategic miscalculations, which have resulted in death and destruction in other countries. This is a recurring American pattern.

Whereto Europe?

The Europeans (or at least 18 of them) convened in London, a couple of days after the Oval Office blowup between Trump and Zelensky. They agreed to their own proposal for a "peace settlement," with the following key points:

●Europe will keep the military aid flowing to Ukraine and increase economic pressure on Russia;

●Any future settlement must include Ukraine at the negotiation table, whereby Ukrainian sovereignty and security are paramount;

●Ukraine's defense capacity will be boosted (by the Europeans) so as to deter future Russian aggression and invasion; and

●The UK and others will commit troops on the ground and planes in the air to secure the peace, provided that there is strong US backing for this.

A month later, any talk of a European "peacekeeping force" has faded. Aside from the British, there was actually little enthusiasm amongst the European states to join the so-called "coalition of the willing." Without America's "strong backing," none of this is meaningful over the medium term; Kellogg's plan has tried to resuscitate this flawed proposal but this too has, as mentioned, emerged stillborn.

Battle Lost

While European leaders persist in trying to talk their way toward a remilitarized Europe, with German re-armament at the heart, it appears that they are committing the error of what Einstein described as "insanity": doing the same thing over and over again in the hope that the next time the outcome will be different. There is a lesson to be learned in this, but Brussels has so far not absorbed the lessons of reality. By way of contrast, Trump knows a loss when he sees it. It's one of the reasons he is exiting post haste. The war in Ukraine has been a military disaster. It is lost. Russia is now in a position where its capacity to wage a modern-day war of attrition is unassailable. The collective West - and that includes the Americans, who've supplied abundant hardware, intelligence support, training, and doctrine knowhow - has been defeated.

The Russian economy has been strengthened as a reaction to the war. Meanwhile, the war caused economic havoc across Europe, and to a lesser extent, the US. More of the same, after leveling the most extensive sanctions campaign against Russia, it is unlikely to make a dent in the Russian economy.

The Europeans are proposing to continue the provision of armaments to Ukraine. This flies in the face of the evidence that this does not and cannot deliver on the stated aims of turning or, at the very least, stemming the tide. Europe will barely be able to defend itself.⁶ Its own defense industrial base is fragmented,⁷ and capacity is chronically limited.⁸ And Europe won't be able to rely on the US whose own limited production capacity will be directed elsewhere.⁹ The UK's own army would be exhausted within six months in the face of a major conflict, admitted a defense minister.¹⁰

The effect of Europe's agreed four-point proposal is the prolonging of the war on the ground for a while longer. On the face of it, this runs contrary to Trump's stated aims. At a level of rhetorical positioning at the very least, Trump has no room to agree to any of the other proposals from the Europeans, including American "backing" for European "boots on the ground." Trump is unlikely to be particularly detained by this European proposition. Whether or not the war is prolonged is immaterial to Trump, provided that the US isn't blamed for the ongoing debacle. This is getting increasingly difficult, yet Trump needs to get out sooner rather than later.¹¹ The window for avoiding responsibility is closing. Trump had little time to move, and perhaps has already squandered his window of opportunity.

Intensifying Deterrence

With short memories, the Europeans propose to intensify Ukrainian deterrence capacity. The Western powers have spent the best part of their time since 2014 building up the AFU, to the point where it became Europe's largest land army. None of this deterred Russia. In fact, arguably, it provoked Russia. It triggered a security dilemma. Persistent talk of Ukrainian membership in NATO as the principal deterrence mechanism only made things worse. After all, this is one of the root causes of the conflict as far as the Russians are concerned. Root causes: don't forget the root causes.

In any case, material constraints mean that the Europeans are in no state to deliver on such "deterrence" promises. The Russians have been clear that one of the objectives of their special military operation is to demilitarize Ukraine. The initialed Istanbul Accord spoke of a Ukrainian defense force reduced to a cap of about 85,000 troops with missile systems that could deliver no further than 40 km. When the Europeans talk of boosting Ukrainian deterrence as part of a peace settlement, they are clearly detached from these realities. The Russians have no need to concede to any watering down of their principal objectives. Their position on the battlefield dictates this reality.

If the Europeans and Ukrainians aren't ready for peace negotiations, the Russians will fight on. This reality hems Trump in too. His divided team doesn't help, but without bringing the Europeans and Ukrainians into the game plan, the risk was always that they would become saboteurs. Perhaps he knew this and didn't care much either way.

Foreign Troops?

Lastly, the Europeans speak of some notion of a peacekeeping force, comprising UK and European troops on the ground and planes in the air. Kellogg's recent maps depict how this might work. There are two principal reasons why such a proposition will not work, aside from the fact that Europe lacks sufficient material capabilities.

Firstly, the Russians have been unswervingly clear that they will not agree to any foreign troops in Ukraine. For peacekeeping to comply with international law, it would need to be sanctioned by the UN Security Council where Russia holds a veto right. Second, the European proposal presupposes strong American "backing," which isn't forthcoming.

Unless Trump changes his mind, there will be no American-backed security guarantee. Recall Hegseth's words at the pre-Munich Security Conference gathering. He made it clear that any European forces committed to Ukraine would be in their own name, and not under the banner of NATO. Put plainly, there will be no Article 5 protection.

Much of the European plan is a non-starter.

Crystal Ball

Short Term

As things stand, the state of play is defined by the following: Firstly, a clear desire by the Americans to cut and run, hampered by a lack of a clear pathway to peace and contradictions from within the Trump administration. Secondly, the Europeans seek to prolong the war and keep the Americans entangled in Ukraine, even if only by way of a "backstop." Thirdly, Russian preponderance on the battlefield, and a resolute focus on addressing the "root causes."

Trump is unlikely to change course; the Americans' priorities are China, and what the Europeans end up doing will ultimately be a matter for the Europeans. If the war is prolonged, the US is unlikely to care that much, so long as it can extricate itself without excessive (or any) humiliation. Trump will opine that he tried to bring peace, but Zelensky and the Europeans weren't ready for it. In practical terms, if the Russians continue to be engaged in a war, absorbing resources, then so be it. Whether this is an intentional "division of labor" plan is immaterial, when the effect is just that: the Europeans will keep the Russians occupied, and the Americans can turn their attention to China.

None of this helps in securing lasting peace. Whatever agreement the Americans reach with the Russians, if any, won't mean much "on the ground" as far as the war is concerned, unless the Europeans and Ukrainians are willing to accept the terms. Any peace settlement would require agreements with both the Americans, NATO, and Ukraine, as the Russians know full well. As far as the Russians are concerned, an agreement with the US but not with NATO, and without buy-in from the Ukrainians, is insufficient to achieve a settlement of the root causes of the conflict.

In this context, the problem for the Europeans is that their proposed course of action is unlikely to bear fruit. At some point in the not-too-distant future, Russia will take control of more Ukrainian territory. Putin has periodically spoken of Novorossiya, which is suggestive that Russia may aim to bring Odessa back into Russia. Only with a complete victory on the ground can we expect a resolution of the conflict. For now, the European path is a recipe for more bloodshed. Is this another six months? Twelve months? Two years? Or is this being set up as a "forever war," but with the Europeans footing the bill?

Medium Term

Trump does not see Ukraine as America's war. He wants out. Whether over the medium term he sees the US fully extricated from Europe or not remains unclear. For now, whatever disdain he has for both, the EU and NATO are seen as useful vassals provided that they foot the bill. Trump has little reason to care about what happens to Ukraine now, especially if he can secure some "deal" on rare earths that he can present as a "trophy" to his base.

The challenge for Europe is a balancing act: on the one hand, doing enough to keep Trump ensnared in Europe while at the same time, beginning to build up their own capabilities to "go it alone." They're trying that now. Trump is aware of this, and won't be easily cornered. We have seen this already, as he dealt with Macron and Starmer with short shrift. However, without making a clean break with the Americans, the Europeans are at risk of being permanent vassals with a security master whose commitment to unconditional support has wavered.

The Europeans need to prepare for a post-Trump world. The recent imposition of tariffs on Europe by Trump adds salt to the wounds, and demonstrates that the transatlantic alliance, for what it's worth, is on thin ice. Even Ursula von der Leyen has conceded that "we will never go back anymore to the status quo."¹² At some point, Europe will need to resolve the Ukraine war. This will involve arriving at some agreement with Russia, despite not wanting to. Ukraine will have to accept this as well. At the same time, Europe - if it can be described in singular terms at all - will be compelled to reconfigure its overall sense of its own geo-economic future not as a "butt-end" of a transatlantic power, but as an enduring bulwark of a Eurasian economic mass.¹³

This won't be easy, and perhaps it will be too much to ask. European powers will need to address three core barriers to this pivot:

1.The longstanding and chronic Russophobia must be addressed.¹⁴ Without doing so, it will be hard to deal sensibly with geographic realities. Russia is a neighbor; the Americans are not. Geography cannot be changed, and a modus vivendi with Russia is in Europe's security interests. If engaging deeply with Russia is a bridge too far, then there is a need to consider how engagement with China can create a new triangulation. Arriving at a new economic accord with China, particularly in light of Trump's capricious tariffs, is essential to Europe's long term economic prospects.

2.Military realities trump morality aggrandizement. The bitter pill of defeat will need to be swallowed. This may be hard, but it also makes sense to move on from America's war in Europe. If Trump wants to blame others, then others can also hold the US accountable. After all, it was the US, under Bush Junior, that introduced the possibility of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO, against the best sense of European leaders at the time, like Angela Merkel. A broader Europe-wide security architecture will need to be fashioned, and can be done so in the wider context of Eurasian security. This brings other continental powers to the table, to act as third-party balancers and perhaps even guarantors. Perhaps the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the appropriate umbrella format for such discussions.

3.Longstanding Eurocentric civilizational primacy as a disposition needs to be addressed. Without doing so, Europe will be handicapped in its ability to address the conditions needed for its economic revitalization. This means coming to terms with the rise of Asia, China principally, and embracing the opportunities this brings. The US has no interest in bolstering the Eurozone; for Trump, the EU was created to "screw over" the US.¹⁵ Trump's America will continue to strip-mine European industry and labor markets for successful companies and talented people. Vance's speech at the Munich conference was a clear shot across the bow. The tariffs are clearly aimed at hastening the hollowing out of European industry, even as Europe prepares to retaliate.¹⁶

These are major burdens that constrain the present "agency envelope." These limit the field of possibilities for Europe as a whole, and for European nations individually. Those that succeed in addressing these barriers are likely to, at the very least, expand the array of policy options available to them. Those that don't will be marooned in fighting a war that is debilitating and which, ultimately, drains the economic lifeblood from Western Europe.

An independent Europe post-Trump is possible. The realities of geography cannot be avoided; a modus vivendi within the context of a new Eurasian architecture is possible; an economic accord with China is an imperative. If the present crop of European leaders in Brussels fail, then the centrifugal forces pulling Europe apart will only intensify.

A European project fit for the 21^st century must be a Eurasian project.

 

 

 

1. Oren Cass, "Europe Must Choose Between America and China," Financial Times, April 12, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/70294411-3738-45cd-b582-c60c238593d1.

2. Warwick Powell, "Multipolarity in Contest," China-US Focus, February 27, 2025, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/multipolarity-in-contest.

3. Adam Entous, "The Partnership: The Secret History of the War in Ukraine," The New York Times, March 29, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/03/29/world/europe/us-ukraine-military-war-wiesbaden.html.

4. Ellie Cook, "Ukraine Has Run Out of ATACMS: Report," Newsweek, March 13, 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-atacms-usa-military-aid-weapons-running-out-donald-trump-russia-peace-2043959.

5.  "President Trump, VP Vance Are Standing Up for Americans," The White House, February 28, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/02/president-trump-vp-vance-are-standing-up-for-americans/.

6. Alexandr Burilkov and Guntram B. Wolff, "Defending Europe Without the US: First Estimates of What Is Needed," Bruegel, February 21, 2025, https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed.

7. Arno Van Rensbergen, "Europe's Fragmented Defense Industry Faces Efficiency Challenges amid Trump's Return," The Parliament Magazine, January 9, 2025, https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/a-fragmented-defence-industrial-base-is-holding-back-eu-armament.

8. "Germany Is Rearming Too Slowly to Stand Up to Russia," Kiel Institute for the World Economy, September 10, 2024, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/news/germany-is-rearming-too-slowly-to-stand-up-to-russia/.

9. "The US Defense Industrial Base Can No Longer Reliably Supply Europe," Bruegel, December 18, 2024, https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/us-defence-industrial-base-can-no-longer-reliably-supply-europe.

10. Deborah Haynes, "British Army Would Be Worn Down 'in Six Months to a Year' in a Major War, Minister Warns," Sky News, December 4, 2024, https://news.sky.com/story/british-army-would-be-devastated-in-six-months-to-a-year-in-a-major-war-minister-warns-13266702.

11. Warwick Powell, "Trump Short on Time, Wiggle Room," China-US Focus, January 7, 2025, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/trump-short-on-time-wiggle-room.

12. Roula Khalaf, Henry Foy, and Andy Bounds, "EU Warns of Taxing US Big Tech if Trump Trade Talks Fail," Australian Financial Review, April 11, 2025, https://www.afr.com/world/europe/eu-warns-of-taxing-us-big-tech-if-trump-trade-talks-fail-20250411-p5lr55.

13. Warwick Powell, "Europe Faces Historic Choices After Xi's Visit," China-US Focus, May 17, 2024, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/europe-faces-historic-choices-after-xis-visit.

14. George Beebe and Anatol Lieven, "Rampant Russophobia Takes Us down a Dangerous Path," Responsible Statecraft, June 21, 2023, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/06/21/rampant-russophobia-takes-us-down-a-dangerous-path/.

15. "Donald Trump Says EU Was 'Formed to Screw the United States' and Threatens 25% Tariffs," Sky News, February 26, 2025, https://news.sky.com/story/donald-trump-says-eu-was-formed-to-screw-the-united-states-and-threatens-25-tariffs-13317606.

16. Camille Gijs et al., "EU to Trump on Tariffs: Go Ahead, Make Our Day," POLITICO, February 28, 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-tariffs-eu-trade-anti-coercion-instrument/.

 

This article is from Vol. 55 issue of TI Observer (TIO), which examines Europe's future amid a turbulent global landscape, offering in-depth perspectives on its current challenges and exploring how Europe can rebuild its security capabilities, regain a competitive edge in science and technological development, and achieve strategic objectives. If you are interested in knowing more about the issue, please click here:

http://en.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2025/4/30/10458855a69f087c-0.pdf

 

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