Overreaction to US-Russia Overhead Diplomacy May Put Europe in Jeopardy

May 27, 2025

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After US and Russian representatives met in Saudi Arabia, Europe reacted strongly. Some Europeans declared that even if the US were to withdraw its support for Ukraine, Europe would continue to back Ukraine alone and would not let Russia win this war.

 

However, realistically speaking, does Europe have the ability to support Ukraine in this war? If European states escalate their commitment, they might provoke serious economic or political backlash at home.

Europe has already provided Ukraine with a large amount of military assistance, including artillery, armored vehicles, and air defense systems, with Germany, Poland, and others amongst the main contributors. However, Europe's stockpiles are limited, and continued assistance risks depleting Europe's own defense capabilities. Moreover, European defense industries lack the production capacity needed to replenish equipment quickly.

Europe's logistical capacity is stretched. Although the continent benefits from established rail and road links into Ukraine, the ongoing war has disrupted and damaged this transport network. Europe currently lacks large-scale long-range delivery capabilities and is unable expediently to deliver more military supplies to the front line.

Although Europe has a certain consensus on providing political and diplomatic support to Ukraine, that consensus has its limits. For example, although the EU still hopes to bring Ukraine into the EU, member states differ on the duration of their aid commitments. Some countries, such as Hungary, have an ambiguous attitude toward Russia and are therefore skeptical about unlimited aid to Ukraine.

Europe's weaknesses are apparent: when it comes to missiles, air defense, cyber defense, and satellites, Europe has next to nothing. For years, these capabilities were either neglected or outsourced to the Americans. Even a trillion EUR boost in defense spending doesn't go far when a single Leopard tank costs about 25 million EUR, and a Typhoon fighter, about 140 million EUR.

It's not just a question of funding; it takes manpower to build, program, and operate weapon systems. Moving an armored brigade to Lithuania to reinforce NATO's eastern flank? The German Bundeswehr has been struggling with this for nearly five years.

Europe doesn't have much time to answer all these questions, especially for Friedrich Merz, the new German Chancellor. Never before has a chancellor been asked to get to work so quickly. The struggle to defend the country may define Friedrich Merz's entire chancellorship. Yet beneath the urgent scramble lies a more profound dilemma: Does this rapid military buildup contradict the core values of a German republic that has long been committed to peace? Could it create peace with weapons?

So, what are the risks of European countries increasing their aid to Ukraine?

First, the risk of escalation of war has never been more imminent. Europe's military aid to Ukraine may trigger a strong reaction from Russia, and cause the conflict to spill over into NATO countries. If Europe's aid to Ukraine alters front line dynamics, Russia may in turn intensify its energy, cyber, and hybrid warfare pressure on Europe.

Second, rising economic and energy vulnerabilities are a looming concern. Although Europe has replaced much of Russia's energy supply since the beginning of the war, the continent's energy supply remains susceptible. Further sanctions that sever remaining energy ties would drive up costs and deepen inflationary pressures. In addition, Ukraine's reconstruction will require huge funds, potentially creating a long-term fiscal burden for European states.

Third, deepening political divisions within Europe - namely a decade of stagnant growth - have left many Europeans dissatisfied, and protests are on the rise. If Europe falls into the trap of long-term aid to Ukraine, it will lead to fatigue among European people, and extremist parties, several of which are already in power in EU member states, could exploit that fatigue to argue against further support for Ukraine due to economic pressure or realpolitik.

Fourth, overextension of strategic resources is a long-term concern. If Europe puts too many resources into Ukraine, it will certainly weaken its influence in other regions, such as the Asia-Pacific and Africa. Focusing predominantly on traditional military assistance also risks sidelining Europe's traditional strengths - diplomacy and economic statecraft - and could weaken Europe's long-term strategic position.

Under the dual pressures of rising populism within Europe and the spillover of American populism, will Europe's resolute support for Ukraine at all costs endanger its own redefinition?

First, Europe is heavily dependent on the United States, and supporting Ukraine at the risk of breaking with the United States may intensify the conflict with the Trump administration.

Europe relies on the United States for energy. After cutting off cheap Russian energy, Europe turned to the United States' expensive liquefied natural gas (LNG), which increased its economic burden and inflationary pressure. Strategically, Europe needs US support for energy security, but this also puts Europe in a passive position in their relations. Militarily, Europe has long relied on the United States for protection under the NATO framework, and many European countries lack independent military capabilities. If the United States insists on going against Europe, Europe's security, energy supply, and international trade will encounter greater difficulties.

Second, the impact of American populism on Europe may expand. The Trump administration's "America First" policy provides a template for European populists. They follow Trump's example, advocating "country first" and opposing EU integration.

Trump and his allies (such as US Vice President Vance) openly support European far-right parties (such as the German AfD), which further fuels the arrogance of European populists.

European far-right parties (such as the French Rassemblement National and the Italian Fratelli d'Italia) have made significant progress in elections. A common feature of these parties is that they regard European integration as an avatar for all of Europe's problems and advocate a return to national sovereignty.

Europe's increased defense spending (such as Germany raising its defense budget to more than 2% of GDP) and military buildup will inevitably squeeze resources that could have been used for people's livelihood, education, medical care, and other fields. Against the backdrop of high inflation and rising living costs, public dissatisfaction is rising, damaging governments' credibility.

If aid to Ukraine leads to domestic financial stress and drives inflation out of control, people may vent their grievances on the EU and turn to extremist movements. If extremists gain power in multiple EU member states, the EU may fall into division, and the integration process will likely be seriously hindered.

Stung by the "overhead diplomacy" of the United States and Russia, European countries have encountered fierce backlash, with calls for unity, autonomy, and increased defense spending. However, this backlash may also breed other risks, especially by providing a more favorable environment for the rise of populist extremism.

This contradictory logic essentially reflects the deep-seated problems in the reconstruction of the international order in the post-Cold War era.

1. The outbreak of the crisis of trust in the US-EU alliance

The US bypassed the NATO system and directly engaged in dialogue with Russia, exposing the return of the offshore balancing strategy after the decline of unipolar hegemony. Europe was shocked to find that it was still regarded as a strategic buffer zone rather than an equal partner. This cognitive dislocation was rooted in the power structure inherited from the Yalta system.

2. The paradigm of European geo-security is being deconstructed

After the end of the Cold War, Europe believed that its security situation was greatly improved. The EU and Russia established a model of energy supply in exchange for technology and financial cooperation. The underlying interests of Europe and Russia are tied together, and Europe also had the protection of NATO. Everything seemed perfect. However, the Ukraine war disrupted all arrangements for European security. Energy cooperation between Europe and Russia was interrupted, and the EU continued to impose sanctions against Russia, but these sanctions have shown diminishing marginal effects. The EU's sanctions on Russia have caused divisions among member states, and the wavering positions of countries such as Hungary have exposed the fragility of Europe's common foreign policy. The trend of the US strategic focus shifting to the Asia-Pacific has also forced Europe to consider how it can guarantee its own security without the protection of the United States.

3.The role of the Global South countries on the international stage has become more important

It is no accident that Saudi Arabia hosted the US and Russian negotiations, which reflects the strategic premium that the Gulf countries have gained in the energy crisis. The neutral position of emerging powers such as India and Brazil on the Ukraine issue is deconstructing the Western-led sanctions alliance. If Europe cannot build a more inclusive security architecture, its positioning may very well be diluted by the pragmatic diplomacy of the "global majority."

 

 

This article is from Vol. 55 issue of TI Observer (TIO), which examines Europe's future amid a turbulent global landscape, offering in-depth perspectives on its current challenges and exploring how Europe can rebuild its security capabilities, regain a competitive edge in science and technological development, and achieve strategic objectives. If you are interested in knowing more about the issue, please click here:

http://en.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2025/4/30/10458855a69f087c-0.pdf

 

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