Can Europe Speak with One Voice? The Search for a Coherent Foreign Policy

May 29, 2025

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A satirical take contrasts global leadership: President Xi Jinping, calm with The Art of War, embodies China's patient strategy; President Donald Trump, flamboyant with The Art of the Deal, reflects the US transactional approach; Europe clings to Stefan Zweig's The World of Yesterday, steeped in nostalgia, existential drift, and ongoing search for global relevance.

 

In a multipolar world, tinged with the risks of renewed bipolarity, the European Union remains caught between values and interests, collective positions and institutional fragmentation, and the diverging perspectives of 27 member states. Too often, this produces a slow, lowest-common-denominator consensus, or worse, a fragmented voice that confuses allies and rivals alike. If Europe is to remain relevant, it must find and project a voice of its own.

 

Torn Between the Single Market and Sovereignty: The EU's Struggle for Unity

At the heart of the European project lies a fundamental tension: the ideals of integration clashing with the pull of national sovereignty. While the single market and shared legal frameworks bind member states economically, foreign policy remains fiercely guarded by national capitals, with each country prioritizing its own interests at the expense of EU unity. This fragmentation complicates efforts to form a cohesive foreign policy. Meanwhile, global powers like Washington, Beijing, or Moscow prefer dealing with member states bilaterally. As multilateralism frays and other powers grow more assertive, the EU's fragmented approach to external relations grows untenable.

 

This challenge has become increasingly pressing as the EU seeks a stronger geopolitical role, a vision championed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and rooted in French President Emmanuel Macron's call for strategic autonomy. The goal is for Europe to defend and promote its interests independently, choosing its partners rather than depending on them. Yet despite high-level strategies, foreign and security policies remain more aspirational than operational.

 

Von der Leyen's 2019 pledge to transform the Commission from a regulatory body into a geopolitical actor has largely fallen flat, as it was not accompanied by the fundamental reforms required - among them, abandoning unanimity in foreign policy decision-making and failing to speak a common language of strategic interests. Adopted just one month after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the 2022 Strategic Compass - a strategy designed to enhance the Union's security and defense capabilities for greater autonomy - still falls short of expectations, with limited clarity on the financial instruments introduced under the 2025 "ReArm Europe" initiative for joint defense procurement despite its unprecedented nature.

 

These failures continue to boil down to the fact that deep internal divisions persist, especially in policies toward the US and China. As global power dynamics shift rapidly, Europe risks falling behind - its hesitations exploited by others, its voice fading on the world stage.

 

Too Little, Too Late: Ukraine, Trump, and the EU's Fading Resolve

Trump's withdrawal from global leadership during his first term offered Europe a rare opening to redefine its role. Rather than seizing the moment to rally public support for a more assertive and independent EU foreign policy, European leaders resorted to criticizing his administration, squandering a chance for strategic transformation. The return to more stable transatlantic ties under Biden reinforced the EU's reliance on the US, sidelining ambitions for strategic autonomy and a stronger political voice.

 

Arguably, the EU's most cohesive foreign policy response came after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Despite early divisions over how to approach Moscow, member states quickly united in condemning the aggression. The EU aligned with NATO, swiftly agreed on a substantial package of economic sanctions, and coordinated efforts closely with the US and the UK. Former High Representative Josep Borrell hailed the moment as the "birth of a geopolitical Europe."

 

Since then, this solidarity has had limited strategic impact. The EU response, while symbolically strong, has not significantly weakened Russia's position nor equipped Ukraine with the sustained support needed for victory. Without US leadership, intelligence, and equipment, Ukraine's resilience might not have held. If Europe is to take greater responsibility for Kiev's future, it must develop a more unified and capable foreign policy architecture. Beyond institutional integration, this demands the cultivation of a shared European strategic culture, one that encompasses not only security, but also the broader forces shaping the global order, from finance and energy to industry and trade. Only then can the EU truly begin to speak the language of power.

 

This need is all the more urgent amid the return of Donald Trump, the escalating intensity of great-power competition, and the global shift from a liberal-led trade order toward a new era of national capitalism, one in which states possess the agility to act decisively in ways the EU cannot. Indeed, Trump's sweeping tariffs have once again exposed Europe's weakness. The response to these tariffs presents yet another test of the EU's stance in the global order: either answer back or risk conceding to a bad deal.

 

At a recent meeting on April 7 in Luxembourg, EU trade ministers issued a message of proportional unity, but the façade quickly crumbled under disagreement on key tools like trade retaliation and the Anti-Coercion Instrument. Even in areas where alignment should be possible, consensus proves elusive. In this case, it was countries like Ireland and the Baltics which leaned toward bilateral trade negotiations with the US. Others, led by more core members such as France, Germany, and Spain, advocated for a more collective approach.

 

Once again, the EU confuses consensus-building and deliberation with indecision and a lack of assertiveness. While Trump's announcement of a 90-day suspension on certain tariffs may temporarily reward the EU's caution, its reluctance to deploy stronger trade policy tools (or even to respond swiftly) reinforces an image of weakness in the eyes of two great powers, the US and China, who equate power with speed and decisiveness.

 

Good Cop, Bad Cop: The EU Undermines Its Own Foreign Policy When Dealing with China

The EU's foreign policy is uniquely constrained by its diffuse power structure, which also magnifies an unnecessary tension between political values and interests in foreign policy. This is especially visible in the bloc's relationship with China.

 

The EU's institutional fragmentation is evident in the sidelining of the European Parliament, which plays little role in foreign policy and often defaults to a human rights watchdog rather than a strategic actor. A disjointed "good cop, bad cop" dynamic further undermines coherence: while Brussels (particularly the Commission) has grown more assertive toward China through anti-subsidy investigations and critical rhetoric, many member states undercut these efforts through their own bilateral engagements. Pragmatism frequently trumps principle, leaving Brussels to manage the fallout. In 2023-25, Germany, France, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, and Spain all charted independent paths, most notably, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez's Beijing visit amid rising US trade pressure in April 2025. This underscores how national (and at times even personal) interests continue to take precedence over EU unity.

 

Indeed, Europe continues to speak in tongues and confuses allies and rivals alike by conflating the promotion of liberal values with the practice of foreign policy, which, at its core, is about managing relationships, projecting influence, and securing interests beyond one's borders. This disconnect exposes a lack of coherence - and at times hypocrisy - in the EU's approach to China, but also reveals a divergence between EU-wide positions and the national interests of its member states for China and other greater powers to exploit through divide-and-conquer tactics.

 

If European institutions begin to speak the language of interests - a language understood by member states, the US, China, and the Global South - they can not only bridge the divide between Brussels and national capitals by jointly defending the same core interests, but also position the EU as a more credible and attractive strategic partner across the world. This shift would be valuable at a time when Europe's alliance with the US is under strain. Crucially, the need to close the gap between EU institutions and member states in foreign policy could be most effectively addressed in the context of resetting the EU's relationship with China, an urgent task as Europe seeks to hedge against mounting economic headwinds. However, shifting the EU's approach to addressing the "good cop, bad cop" dynamic won't be enough to resolve deeper disharmonies or create perfectly aligned, bloc-wide positions.

 

The indispensable role of national governments remains both the source of, and the solution to, many of the EU's challenges. A constructive path forward would be to foster strategic convergence, among member states and between them and EU institutions, by building shared strategic interests and more closely aligning national positions. Framing the world through a common lens can help member states see that alignment often advances their own interests, and that their destinies are deeply interconnected. This effort could begin with a focus on high-priority, low-risk regions or issues, helping to build habits of cooperation and trust that prepare the EU to navigate more complex relationships with major powers like China. In the meantime, forming "coalitions of the willing" to act jointly when full consensus is out of reach offers a pragmatic interim step. These groups can serve as informal cores and pathfinders around which the necessary broader consensus can gradually form. There may never be a perfect moment to do this, but the current moment demands it.

 

The Way Forward: One EU Voice or None

Europe has often been reactive rather than visionary, responding to crises like COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine only when under pressure. However, signs of resilience are emerging. The EU's Winter 2025 Eurobarometer shows 89% of citizens believe greater unity is crucial for addressing global challenges, with at least 75% agreement across all member states. Efforts to destabilize the EU may actually boost public support for collective action. This perception must be matched by stronger European public diplomacy and investment in a European strategic culture that speaks the common language of interests. These efforts could help citizens view the EU as a unified global actor, countering democratic fragmentation and increasing domestic pressure on governments to align more closely with foreign policy.

 

Encouraging signs suggest Europe may be ready for its next strategic step. There is increasing alignment between two key factors central to pushing a unified EU foreign policy: Germany's economic strength and influence, and France's role in shaping Europe's collective geopolitical clout. If these central actors, now demonstrating greater political will, can align more closely with key eastern players like Poland and agree to share more foreign policy sovereignty, they could play a pivotal role, alongside EU institutions, in incentivizing alignment through funding and other forms of leverage - linking EU resources, defense cooperation, and access to diplomatic tools to foreign policy coordination.

 

But true strategic autonomy demands more than popular and member state support. It requires confronting Europe's deep interdependence with the United States, economically, militarily, and psychologically. Should the current US administration grow more hostile toward Europe or tilt further toward Moscow, the EU may be forced to accelerate a recalibration of the transatlantic relationship. In this context, re-engaging with China also offers a crucial test case, an opportunity for the EU to begin forging a unified foreign policy grounded not in principles alone, but in clearly defined common European interests.

We are on the cusp of historic changes that will force the EU to make defining choices. A key challenge in foreign policy has been the reluctance of governments to recognize that their fates are bound together. It took a pandemic, a Ukraine-induced recession, and the return of Trump for Germany to learn this lesson, but learn it, it did. This moment of crisis should serve as a long-overdue catalyst, a chance for Europe to reset and finally craft a coherent strategy for engaging with the US and China, and the world, starting with joint assessments and increasing convergence of strategic interests, first into blocs and eventually into fully formed consensus. The choice is clear: much more Europe - or far less. If the EU wants a seat at the table of global power, the time to speak with one voice is now.

 

 

This article is from Vol. 55 issue of TI Observer (TIO), which examines Europe's future amid a turbulent global landscape, offering in-depth perspectives on its current challenges and exploring how Europe can rebuild its security capabilities, regain a competitive edge in science and technological development, and achieve strategic objectives. If you are interested in knowing more about the issue, please click here:

http://en.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2025/4/30/10458855a69f087c-0.pdf

 

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